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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is appropriate under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996), § 35A-4-508(8) (Supp. 1998), and § 63-46(b)-
16 (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether there was "good cause" for the late filing of Edwards' appeal 
of the initial denial of unemployment compensation based on his attorney's 
misinterpretation of the statutory deadline. 
2. Whether employer Autoliv suffered substantial prejudice when it was 
unable to present evidence from its cross-examination of the claimant to the fact-
finder because of gaps in the hearing record. 
3. Whether Autoliv established that Edwards was discharged for just 
cause based on his drug/alcohol usage. 
a. Whether Edwards' confession of cocaine use to his employer 
was an admission by a party-opponent and thus not hearsay. 
b. Whether Edwards' confession was improperly excluded from 
evidence by the Board as hearsay. 
1 
i 
4. Whether the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") suggestive comments 
i 
to the claimant and the ALJ's overall conduct undermined the impartiality of the 
proceeding. 
i 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court of appeals may grant relief if the Workforce Appeals Board (the 
"Board") has "erroneously interpreted or applied the law" and Autoliv has been " 
substantially prejudiced as a result. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(d) (1997). 
The Board's findings of fact and its application of these facts to the law should not * 
be disturbed, however, "so long as [they fall] within the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality." DuMac. Inc. v. Board of Review, 958 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah Ct. < 
App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
I 
The issue of whether Edwards established "good cause" for the late filing of 
his unemployment appeal is governed by Utah Administrative Code R994-406-308 
I 
(Supp. 1997). This provision provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is determined 
that the appeal was delayed for good cause. Good cause is 
limited to circumstances where it is shown that: * 
(a) the appeal was filed within ten days of actual receipt of 
the decision . . . ; or 
(b) the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the appellant; or 4 
(c) the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances 
which were compelling and reasonable. 
2 « 
Utah Administrative CodeR994-406-310(2)(b) (Supp. 1997) governs 
whether Autoliv was afforded a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing. This 
provision states, in pertinent part: 
Any party to an [unemployment compensation] appeal will be 
given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present any 
pertinent evidence of probative value and to know and rebut by 
cross-examination or otherwise any other evidence submitted. 
Utah Administrative Code R994-405-208(6)(f) (Supp. 1997) establishes that 
employers may establish a prima facie case for just cause termination with 
evidence other than drug testing. This regulation states as follows: 
In addition to the drug and alcohol testing provisions above, a 
prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under the 
Employment Security Act may be established through the 
introduction of other competent evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Autoliv ASP, Inc. ("Autoliv") terminated the employment 
of Jon Edwards ("Edwards") for violating the Company's drug-free workplace 
policy. After reporting to work on April 1,1998 smelling of alcohol, Edwards was 
administered and failed a drug/alcohol screen. Edwards then admitted to one of 
Autoliv's human resource managers that, in addition to drinking about fourteen 
cans of beer during the twenty-four hours before his shift, he had used cocaine. 
3 
i 
Based on these admissions and his failed drug/alcohol screen, Autoliv terminated 
i 
Edwards' employment on April 6,1998. 
Edwards filed for unemployment compensation on April 14,1998. Autoliv 
has opposed Edwards' application for unemployment benefits on the grounds that 
Edwards was terminated for just cause. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Edwards filed an application for unemployment compensation on 
April 14,1998. On May 21,1998, the Department of Workforce Services (the * 
"Department") sent Edwards a notice granting him benefits. The next day, on 
May 22,1998, the Department sent Edwards a second notice revoking his | 
unemployment benefits because he had been discharged for just cause. 
On June 10, 1998, Edwards filed an appeal of the denial of benefits with the 
Department. Administrative Law Judge Norman Barnes (the "judge" or "ALJ") 
conducted a hearing on July 7,1998 and awarded Edwards benefits in a decision 
I 
dated July 9, 1998. Autoliv appealed the ALJ's decision to the Department of 
Workforce Services Appeals Board (the "Board"). The Board affirmed the ALJ's 
decision on September 11, 1998. 
Autoliv filed a timely Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals on 
October 9,1998. < 
4 i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
1. Petitioner Autoliv ASP, Inc. ("Autoliv") manufactures air bag systems 
that are installed as life-saving safety devices in automobiles. Because of its 
concern for both the safety of its employees during the manufacturing process and 
the integrity of its products, Autoliv has adopted a strict drug and alcohol policy 
that complies with Utah law. [R. 30; R. 32,14:36-39] 
2. Autoliv's Employee Handbook, which respondent Edwards 
acknowledged receiving, warned that "[u]se or distribution of illegal drugs and 
misuse of prescription drugs and/or alcohol cannot, and will not, be tolerated on 
the job and will be grounds for termination if confirmed by a positive test result." 
[R. 26; R. 30,14:45-47] 
3. On May 1,1997, Autoliv enacted an Employee Assistance Program, 
which allowed employees to voluntarily enter rehabilitation programs for 
substance abuse. Autoliv sent a memorandum to all employees encouraging them 
to step forward to deal with any such problem. The memorandum also warned that 
"[a]ny employee testing positive [on a drug or alcohol test] will be terminated." 
[R. 29] 
5 
Edwards* Termination 
4. On April 6,1998, Autoliv terminated Edwards' employment for 
violating the company's substance abuse policy. [R. 2; R. 30,20:25-26] 
5. Edwards, who worked as an assembler for Autoliv and regularly 
operated a rivet gun, had a history of employment-related substance abuse 
problems. [R. 32,13:50,15:22-33,37:10-11; R. 26; R. 27] 
6. For example, on October 12,1996, while driving a company-rented 
vehicle during a business trip, Edwards was arrested and charged with driving 
under the influence of alcohol. [R. 26; R. 27; R. 32,15:22-33] 
7. As a result of this incident, Autoliv placed Edwards on probation for 
one year and provided him with written notice that "any future problems may 
result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination." [R. 26] 
8. On April 1, 1998, during the morning shift that began at 6:00 am, 
Edwards' supervisor noticed that Edwards smelled of alcohol. [R. 32: 34:30-31] 
9. Edwards testified that his supervisor asked him whether he had been 
drinking, and Edwards admitted that he had gone "to the Jazz game [the previous 
night] and that [he] had been drinking, but not after 1:00 in the morning." [R. 32, 
40:15-19] 
10. Based on the supervisor's observations and Edwards' admission, 
Autoliv concluded that it had reasonable suspicion to require Edwards to submit to 
6 
a drug test under its policy. Edwards was therefore asked to provide a urine 
sample for a drug/alcohol screen. [R. 32,33:25-31] 
11. Edwards' urine sample was collected at approximately 11:30 on the 
morning of April 1,1998 by WorkMed of Ogden, which sent the specimen to 
Northwest Toxicology Laboratory in Salt Lake City for a 9-drug with alcohol 
screen. [R. 1; R. 32,33:25-37] 
12. On April 6,1998, Medical Review Officer Dr. Lee H. Potter sent a 
Drug Test Report to Autoliv indicating a positive test result on the 9-drug with 
alcohol screen. This report did not specify whether Edwards' sample contained 
drugs, alcohol, or both. [R. 1] 
13. Pam Gunnell, one of Autoliv's Human Resource Supervisors, 
confronted Edwards with the positive test result on April 6,1998. Edwards 
volunteered to Gunnell that he had both used an illegal drug and consumed a large 
quantity of alcohol. [R. 32,16:40-41] 
14. At the hearing before the ALJ, Gunnell testified about this 
conversation as follows: 
Gunnell: But before the termination Mr. Edwards admitted 
to us the drugs and alcohol he had used. 
Judge: What drugs did he tell you he had been using? 
Gunnell: He told us that he had been to a Jazz party the 
night before and had drunk a lot of alcohol, and he 
also indicated that he was upset that cocaine 
showed up through his MRO, which I do not get 
7 
the results as to what he is positive for. He gave, 
voluntarily gave me that information. 
Judge: Did he tell you that he had been using cocaine? 
Gunnell: Yes he did. 
[R. 32: 16:40-52,17:1] Later in the hearing, Gunnell summarized that "[Edwards] 
told me himself that he was up late drinking a large amount of alcohol plus the 
cocaine in his system." [R. 32, 31:23-24] 
15. On the basis of these admissions and the positive drug/alcohol test, 
Autoliv terminated Edwards' employment on April 6,1998. Edwards applied for 
unemployment compensation on April 14,1998. [R. 2; R. 9] 
Timeliness of Edwards' Appeal for Unemployment Benefits 
16. On May 21,1998, the Department of Workforce Services mailed 
Edwards a Notice of Claimant Eligibility ("Notice"). This Notice granted benefits 
and stated that Edwards' "claim will be processed for payment unless there are 
other issues to be resolved." [R. 12] 
17. The next day, May 22,1998, the Department of Workforce Services 
reversed itself and denied Edwards unemployment benefits. Edwards was mailed a 
Decision of Eligibility for Unemployment Insurance Benefits ("May 22,1998 
Decision"). The May 22,1998 Decision held that Edwards had been discharged 
for just cause for "not following a reasonable policy, rule, or instruction from [his] 
employer." [R. 14] 
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18. The May 22,1998 Decision stated that "You must appeal in writing 
within 10 calendar days after this decision was mailed." [R. 14] 
19. After receiving this May 22,1998 Decision, Edwards "[w]ent straight 
to [Mr. Phillips, his attorney].... The very next day [after receiving the 
Decision]." [R. 32, 7:36-40, 8:6-8] 
20. At the hearing, Edwards' attorney, Randall Phillips ("Phillips"), 
confirmed that Edwards consulted him about the Decision within the ten days 
allowed for an appeal. [R. 32, 9:37-38 ("I believe it was within the—the ten 
days...")] 
21. Phillips testified that he "probably" went to the law library within the 
ten-day limit to conduct research for the appeal. He also testified that he reviewed 
the Utah Code to determine when the appeal was due. [R. 32,9:44-49,11:42-50] 
22. Both the Utah Code and the Utah Administrative Code contain 
provisions establishing the deadlines to appeal initial determinations of eligibility 
for unemployment compensation. The Utah Code states as follows: 
The claimant... may file an appeal from the 
determination with the Division of Adjudication within 
ten days after the date of mailing of the notice of 
determination or redetermination . .. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-406 (1997) (emphasis added); see also UTAH ADMIN. 
CODER994-406-301 etseq. (Supp. 1997). 
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23. The Utah Administrative Code then allows an additional three days to 
compensate for days during which a notice or decision may have been in transit via 
the postal service. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-406-304 (Supp. 1997). 
24. Based on the ten-day deadline stated in the Decision, Edwards' appeal 
was due on June 1,1998. Even with the addition of three days to account for 
mailing, Edwards' appeal would have been due on June 4,1998. 
25. Phillips, however, did not file an appeal on Edwards' behalf until 
June 10,1998. [R. 15-R. 20] 
26. Phillips was asked at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge 
to explain why the appeal was late. 
Q: So why didn't you do your appeal right after you 
went to the law library? 
A: Again, I'd have to look at my calendar as to why. 
[R. 32,12:1-4] 
27. Phillips was also asked whether he was aware of the deadline. 
Q: Well, did you understand that there was a time 
limitation as far as filing an appeal? 
A: Yes, I did, your honor. The—From what I 
understand is that from ruling that within ten days 
you need to file the appeal... 
[R. 32, 9:51-52,10:1-2 (emphasis added)] 
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28. Phillips then testified that he believed, based on his research at the law 
library, that the Utah Administrative Procedure Act extended the deadline to thirty 
days. [R. 32, 9:51, 52,10:1-23] 
29.The Utah Administrative Procedure Act explicitly and expressly states 
that it does not apply to initial decisions regarding unemployment compensation. 
It reads, in pertinent part: 
This chapter [Administrative Procedures Act] does not 
govern:... the initial determination of any person's 
eligibility for unemployment benefits . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-l(2)(i) (1997) (emphasis added). 
30. In his petition for fees, Phillips stated that he has, during the last three 
years, handled more than ten unemployment appeals. Phillips also stated that he 
has handled more than fifty administrative appeals during six years of practice. 
[R. 42] 
31. Notwithstanding his extensive experience, legal research^ the explicit 
explanation on the Decision, and the express provisions of the Utah Code and the 
Utah Administrative Code, Phillips failed to file Edwards' appeal until 
June 10,1998—nineteen days after the Decision was mailed to his client and 
eighteen days after his client delivered the decision to his attorney. 
11 
Chain of Custody Report 
32. On June 24,1998, the Department of Workforce Services notified 
Autoliv that Administrative Law Judge Norman Barnes would conduct a hearing 
on Edwards' appeal on July 7, 1998. [R. 24] 
33. Autoliv's plant was closed down virtually the entire time between the 
date of this notice and the date of hearing because of the General Motors ("GM") 
strike. [R. 32,21:30-31] 
34. The plant's closure made it impossible for Autoliv to collect crucial 
evidence—namely, the chain of custody report for Edwards' drug test—for 
presentation at the hearing. 
35. On June 29, 1998, nine days before the hearing, Autoliv's 
representatives notified Judge Barnes that this crucial evidence would not be 
available until the strike was resolved. Judge Barnes was sent a copy of a message 
stating, in pertinent part: 
Please explain @ the hearing that the chain of custody 
form will be available for the ALJ upon return from the 
shutdown caused by the strike. 
[R.31] 
36. At the hearing, Autoliv's representatives explained that the strike had 
hindered their efforts to collect the necessary evidence for the hearing: 
Autoliv Rep.: Your Honor, we've been trying to get the 
chain of custody and due to the plant shut-
12 
down, we have not been able to get that 
document. If you need it, I would like to 
ask that the record remain open so we can 
get that document. 
Q: Well, how long has the plant been closed 
down... ? 
A: All of last week and some parts of the week 
before and some parts are shut down this 
week. 
[R. 32,21:21-31] 
37. Autoliv's representative also explained to Judge Barnes that Autoliv's 
in-house counsel had taken reasonable steps to collect the evidence. Autoliv's 
counsel had sent "several messages" in an effort to locate the report and was 
"trying to get the document" for the hearing. [R. 32,29:33-39] 
38. Autoliv's representative repeatedly asked Judge Barnes to accept the 
evidence when it became available: 
Again I'd like to make a request that we be allowed to 
obtain the chain of custody, Your Honor. There were 
some mitigating circumstances and we weren't able to get 
it for today's hearing. 
[R. 32,29:14-16] 
39. After the hearing, and upon conclusion of the strike, Autoliv 
obtained the chain of custody report and submitted it to the Board. [R. 133] 
13 
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The Incomplete and Prejudicial Record 
40. At the hearing, Edwards conceded that he had been drinking heavily 
early into the morning before his 6 am shift. He admitted, under oath, that during 
the previous 24 hours he had consumed "maybe a little over two six packs of beer. 
Maybe 14 cans of beer." [R. 32, 34:43-51, 35:1-2] 
41. On the other hand, Edwards denied that he had discussed his cocaine 
use with Gunnell. Notably, Edwards did not deny that he had used cocaine—he 
only denied discussing it. He testified as follows: 
Judge: And do you remember discussing with [Ms. 
Gunnell] whether or not you had been drinking 
prior to April 1st when you came on shift? 
Edwards: Yeah, I told her exactly what I told you that I had 
been out late at night and I did drink. That's all 
she—you know, that's the only thing she asked 
me. 
Judge: Did you discuss with her using cocaine? 
Edwards: I didn't. 
Judge: Was that subject ever brought up as far as 
cocaine? 
Edwards: It was brought up but we didn't discuss it at all. I 
found out that in the test that the medications that 
I take some of the medications could have shown 
up as all different kinds of things depending on 
how high your blood sugar is or how low your 
blood sugar is. 
[R. 32,35:51-52, 36:1-15 (emphasis added)] 
14 4 
42. Before Edwards' testified, the Administrative Law Judge predicted 
that Edwards would deny that he had used cocaine. Edwards was present during 
the following exchange: 
Gunnell: [Edwards] told me himself he was up late drinking a 
large amount of alcohol plus the cocaine in his 
system. 
Judge: We have no evidence that there was any cocaine in his 
system, and I'm just really guessing Mr. Edwards 
isn't going to testify that he was using cocaine. I'm 
not in his head right now as far as knowing where he's 
coming from, but I'm almost going to bet vou that 
he's not going to tell me that he was using cocaine. 
Gunnell: He'll be under oath. 
Judge: Well, we'll—Well, we'll swear him for testimony and 
ask him if he was using cocaine.... 
[R. 32, 31:24-37 (emphasis added)] 
43. When Edwards was finally sworn to testify, the Administrative Law 
Judge failed to ask Edwards whether he had used cocaine. 
44. The ALJ's failure to ask this vital question left it for the employer's 
representative at the hearing to raise the issue. At the conclusion of the ALJ's 
questioning of the claimant, the employer's representative indicated that "I do have 
a couple of questions." [R. 32,40:34-35]. 
45. Unfortunately, the record of this part of the ALJ's hearing is 
incomplete. Less than a page after the employer's representative began 
questioning Edwards, the transcript indicates: "PROBLEM WITH TAPE— 
15 
MOSTLY INDISCERNIBLE ON ALL OF SIDE 3 - APPROXIMATELY TEN 
MINUTES." [R. 32,41:13-14 (capitals and emphasis added)] 
46. Although lacking most of the employer's cross-examination of 
Edwards, this incomplete transcript served as the basis for the Board's review of 
the ALT' s findings of fact. 
47. The Board adopted the ALJ's findings of fact "in full" except as noted 
in its decision. [R. 76]. 
48. The Board neither acknowledged nor discussed the fact that at least 
ten minutes from the employer's questioning of Edwards was missing from the 
record on review. [R. 75-R. 80] 
16 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The initial question presented by this case is whether the Board erroneously 
accepted Edwards' claim that his attorney's confusion about the filing deadline 
constituted "good cause" for its late filing. This Court should reverse the Board 
and dismiss Edwards' application for unemployment because Edwards' excuse for 
filing his appeal late was neither "compelling" nor "reasonable," as required by the 
Utah Administrative Code. Edwards' attorney acknowledged receiving and 
reading a notice from the Department of Workforce Services (the "Department") 
which stated that any appeal was due within ten days. Edwards' attorney claimed, 
however, that he believed the deadline was actually thirty days, based on his 
review of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (the "Act"). Because this Act 
expressly excludes appeals of initial unemployment decisions, Edwards' excuse is 
unreasonable. Consequently, this Court should reverse the Board and dismiss 
Edwards' appeal as untimely. 
Even if the Board correctly accepted Edwards' appeal, its decision must be 
vacated and the case remanded for further hearing because the Board based its 
decision on an incomplete record. Autoliv suffered substantial prejudice and was 
not afforded a fair hearing because gaps in the hearing transcript—including a ten 
minute block during Autoliv's cross-examination of Edwards—gutted Autoliv's 
right of cross-examination and precluded it from presenting vital testimony to the 
17 
Board, which serves as the ultimate finder of fact. This Court should remedy this 
prejudicial procedural defect by remanding the case to the Board. 
Alternatively, this Court could find it unnecessary to remand because 
Autoliv established with competent evidence that Edwards was terminated for just 
cause. The Board erred because it apparently excluded evidence that is dispositive 
to the case: Edwards' admission to one of Autoliv's human resource officers that 
he had used cocaine. This admission was seemingly excluded by the ALJ and the 
Board as hearsay; however, under Utah's rules of evidence, such confessions are 
admissions by party-opponents and thus, by definition, are not hearsay. Given 
Autoliv's strong interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace—Edwards was not 
assembling hamburgers but rather life-saving safety devices in a dangerous 
manufacturing environment—and given Edwards' confession to illegal drug use, 
Autoliv presented sufficient competent evidence to support Edwards' discharge for 
just cause. 
Finally, this Court should vacate the Board's decision because it was tainted 
by the administrative law judge's prejudicial conduct at the hearing. The judge 
practically coached Edwards to deny using cocaine (although, notably, despite the 
judge's prompting, Edwards did not offer such a denial on the record), badgered 
Autoliv's witnesses and representatives, and refused to accept key evidence into 
the record. Because a reasonable person could question the impartiality of the 
18 
proceeding, this Court should vacate the Board's decision and remand for a hearing 
before a second administrative law judge. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
EDWARDS' APPEAL WAS UNTIMELY. 
This Court should vacate the Board's award of unemployment benefits 
because, contrary to the findings of both the ALJ and the Board, Edwards did not 
establish good cause for the late filing of his appeal. The ALJ concluded that 
"claimant's attorney had reason to believe through his reading of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act that he had 30 days to act on the initial decisions 
issued to his client by the Department." [R. 36] This finding is clearly erroneous 
and cannot, in any case, justify the late filing. 
This Court has never before hesitated to enforce the filing deadline at issue 
in this case. In Armstrong v. Department of Employment Security. 834 P.2d 562 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court rejected as untimely an appeal filed only one day 
late by a pro se claimant who claimed confusion between "working days" and 
"calendar days." In contrast, here an experienced and sophisticated counsel filed 
his appeal at least five days too late because of a "claimed" faulty statutory 
interpretation. This Court should avoid endorsing a double standard between 
attorneys and pro se claimants, particularly one that is more lenient of 
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sophisticated lawyers than of unrepresented parties. Instead, this Court should 
reverse the Board's decision and deny Edwards' unemployment benefits. 
The Board's decision to accept the appeal was clearly erroneous because 
Edwards failed to satisfy any standard of "good cause" for his late filing. The 
circumstances under which a late filing may be accepted are few. The Utah 
Administrative Code states that "[g]ood cause is limited to circumstances where it 
is shown that: 
(a) the appeal was filed within ten days of actual receipt of the 
decision . . .; or 
(b) the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond 
the control of the appellant; or 
(c) the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which 
were compelling and reasonable. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-406-308 (Supp. 1997). 
Edwards' appeal must be dismissed because none of the exceptions apply to 
his situation. Edwards admits that his appeal was not filed within ten days of his 
actual receipt of the denial notice, and he does not contend that his late filing was 
due to circumstances beyond his control. Only the third exception could 
conceivably apply to his circumstances. It is noteworthy, however, that neither the 
ALJ nor the Board characterized the circumstances in this case as "compelling or 
reasonable."1 
1
 The Board was similarly silent, though it stated—without the benefit of 
supporting authority—that the ALJ properly asserted jurisdiction because of an 
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This Court must dismiss Edwards' appeal because the reason for its 
tardiness—namely, his attorney's confusion about the deadline—was neither 
compelling nor reasonable. Edwards' attorney testified that he believed that the 
deadline was governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. This 
explanation is neither reasonable or compelling for at least four reasons. First, the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act plainly states that it does not apply to initial 
decisions regarding unemployment compensation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46(b)-
l(2)(i) (1997). Second, the Utah Code expressly provides that "[t]he 
[unemployment] claimant... may file an appeal from the determination with the 
Division of Adjudication within ten days after the date of mailing of the notice." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-406 (1997) (emphasis added). Third, an explanation of 
this deadline appeared on the notice, which both Edwards and his attorney 
reviewed. Finally, Edwards' excuse is unreasonable because a simple phone call 
to the Department of Workforce Services would have resolved any confusion. 
The Board therefore erred when it concluded that Edwards had shown good 
cause for the late filing of his appeal. It is undisputed that the appeal in this case 
was not filed within ten days, and no "compelling and reasonable" circumstances 
alleged error on the part of the Department of Workforce Services. [R. 132] This 
Court should reject the Board's invention of an additional exception. 
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justified the acceptance of the tardy appeal. Consequently, this Court should 
reverse the Board and dismiss Edwards' claim for unemployment benefits. 
II. AUTOLIV SUFFERED SEVERE PREJUDICE BECAUSE THE 
BOARD MADE FINDINGS OF FACT BASED ON AN INCOMPLETE 
RECORD. 
If this Court accepts Edwards' tardy appeal, then this Court should remand 
this action to the Department of Workforce Services because the Board's role as 
fact-finder was fatally compromised by its receipt of an incomplete record.2 Under 
Utah law, the Board—not the administrative law judge—serves as the finder of 
fact at the administrative level.3 This Court has written that "[w]hile it is the ALT 
who initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact-finder." 
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah 
In its answer to this appeal, the Department of Workforce Services contends that 
the Board's decision "is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record." Answer and Certification of Record (emphasis added). 
Given this statutory standard of review, the Department cannot argue that Autoliv 
is precluded from objecting to an incomplete record. Nor, for that matter, can the 
Department claim that Autoliv somehow waived its right to such an objection at 
the administrative level. Because the Board served as the ultimate fact-finder, 
Autoliv's appeal on these grounds did not ripen until the Board made its factual 
findings without the benefit of all the facts. In any event, the Department has 
now opened the door for Autoliv to pursue this objection by defending its 
decision on the on grounds that it is supported "in light of the whole record." Id 
3
 Utah law is not an anomaly. According to the leading treatise on workers' 
compensation, the decisions of a board, not an ALJ, are deemed conclusive in the 
large majority of states. See 3 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW § 80.12(b) (1994). 
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Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted), cert, denied, Commercial Carriers v. Judd. 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Thus, in this case, even though the administrative law 
judge presided over the hearing and examined the witnesses, the Board bore the 
ultimate responsibility as fact-finder. 
The Board's role as fact-finder was tainted by its receipt of an incomplete 
record. The transcript of the hearing is missing a significant section—both in 
terms of time and subject matter. According to the certified transcript, 
"approximately ten minutes" during the employer's cross-examination of Edwards 
was lost due to problems with the tape. Although Utah law does not require the 
transcription of unemployment appeal hearings, Utah courts—and the United 
States Supreme Court—have consistently required the administrative appeals 
process to incorporate the fundamental requirements of procedural fairness.4 See 
D.B. v. Division of Occupational Professional Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145,1146 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing precedent from the Utah Supreme Court stressing "the 
necessity of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in 
administrative hearings") (reversing agency decision because petitioner was 
4
 Utah law also provides that "the conduct of hearings and appeals . . . [need not] 
conform to common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules 
of procedure." UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-508(5)(a) (Supp. 1998). This 
provision, however, does not extinguish the rights of parties to procedural 
fairness and due process. 
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< 
substantially prejudiced when he was not allowed to confront and cross-examine 
i 
hostile witnesses at the agency hearing). 
Central among these procedural requirements is the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. Id The Utah 
Administrative Code guarantees that "any party to an [unemployment 
compensation] appeal will be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and i 
present any pertinent evidence of probative value and to know and rebut bv cross-
examination." UTAHADMIN. CODER994-406-310(2)(b) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis
 | 
added). This Court has itself stated that "[a]ll parties [to an administrative hearing] 
. . . must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses . . . and to offer evidence 
I 
in explanation or rebuttal." D.B.. 779 P.2d at 1146 (quoting State Department of 
Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council. 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 
1980)). Here, the gaps in the transcript essentially denied Autoliv of these rights. 
Because of these gaps, it was impossible for Autoliv to present vital evidence from 
its cross-examination of the claimant to the ultimate fact-finder.5 * 
Neither the Board nor this Court can properly review a case with an 
incomplete record. This Court has stated that "it is clear that the Board's findings
 ( 
3
 It is ironic and perhaps telling that the Board objected to Autoliv's effort to 
supplement the factual record between the ALJ's hearing and the Board's 
decision, whereas the Board was apparently not troubled by the reduction in the 
record caused by the gaps in the transcript. 
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of fact will be affirmed only if they are 'supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court.'" Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (1988), superseded on other grounds, 819 P.2d 361 (1991)). 
Although not de novo review, this standard requires this Court to consider evidence 
that '"fairly detracts from the weight of the [Board's] evidence.'" Id at 68. Thus, 
this Court must "examine the record as a whole, weighing evidence that both 
supports and detracts from the [Board's] finding." Commercial Carriers. 888 P.2d 
at 711 (emphasis added). Critically, the significant gaps in the hearing transcript 
leave this Court with a record that is less than whole. 
Further, Autoliv was not prejudiced simply because there were gaps in the 
transcript; rather, Autoliv suffered grave prejudice because those gaps created 
crucial holes in the record and undermined its right to present evidence from its 
cross-examination of Edwards. The "missing" testimony from Edwards would 
likely detract from the Board's findings. Indeed, Edwards' testimony would have 
been illuminating on a number of issues—including the dispositive question of 
6
 The ALJ's opinion cannot serve as substitute for the transcript. If the ALJ's 
decision were accepted as such, review by the Board and this Court could not be 
meaningful. After all, without access to other evidence, the Board—the ultimate 
fact-finder—would have little choice but to rubberstamp the ALJ's factual 
findings. Because this surely was not the intent of the legislature in establishing 
this procedure, this Court should remand in order to preserve the integrity of the 
Board's fact-finding mission. 
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whether he used cocaine. Despite the obvious importance of the question, the ALJ 
never directly asked Edwards if he had used cocaine. Thus, it was left for 
Autoliv's representative to ask the question. Unfortunately, because of the 
transcription problem, the record remains silent on this and other key issues. 
This Court has declared that "[ejlementary fairness in unemployment 
compensation adjudications includes a party's right to see adverse evidence and be 
afforded an opportunity to rebut such evidence." Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 70. 
Autoliv was denied this right because the gaps in the transcript left the ultimate 
fact-finder without approximately ten minutes from Autoliv's cross-examination of 
Edwards. As a result, to accord Autoliv "elementary fairness" and procedural due 
process, this Court should remand this action to the administrative level with 
directions that Autoliv may cross-examine Edwards under oath and present 
Edwards' testimony to the Board. 
III. AUTOLIV PRESENTED COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
JUST CAUSE FOR EDWARDS' TERMINATION. 
This Court should reverse the Board's decision because Autoliv established 
with competent evidence that Edwards was terminated for just cause. Contrary to 
the Board's suggestion, an employer may establish a just cause termination for 
drug use without showing that the employer complied with a testing policy. The 
Utah Administrative Code provides that "fijn addition to the drug and alcohol 
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testing provisions above, a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under the 
Employment Security Act may be established through the introduction of other 
competent evidence." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-208(6)(f) (Supp. 1997) 
(emphasis added). In this case, the ALT and the Board found that Autoliv did not 
satisfy the drug and alcohol testing provisions under UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-
405-208(6)(a-e). The Board erred, however, because Autoliv presented other 
competent evidence—namely, Edwards' confession to Gunnell that he had used 
cocaine—to show that Edwards violated Autoliv's zero tolerance drug and alcohol 
policy. 
A. The ALJ and Board Failed to Consider Edwards' Admission that 
He Used Cocaine. 
Edwards' confession to Gunnell is sufficient to support his termination. At 
the hearing, the ALJ correctly noted that hearsay alone cannot support a just cause 
termination. See Hoskings v. Industrial Commission, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). But Edwards' confession to 
Gunnell is not hearsay and is thus competent evidence to support Edwards' just 
cause termination. According to Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[a] 
statement is not hearsay if:.. . the statement is offered against a party and is the 
party's own statement." UTAHR. EVID. 801(d)(2). Here, Edwards' own statement 
is being offered against him. As a result, the confession is not hearsay. 
27 
< 
Accordingly, the Board erred when it either excluded from evidence or 
t 
discounted Edwards' confession. The Board never discussed Edwards' confession, 
but its exclusion from evidence can be inferred from the ALJ's statement that "the 
employer's sum total of evidence . . . consists of the claimant's acknowledgment 
that he had been drinking the night before the drug test and an observation that he 
smelled of alcohol." [R. 129] Given that the confession is not hearsay, the ALJ i 
erroneously concluded that "[t]he employer's entire case . . . consisted of hearsay* 
evidence." [R. 129] .
 f 
B. Autoliv Established Just Cause for Edwards' Discharge. 
This Court should dismiss Edwards' application for unemployment benefits . 
because Autoliv established just cause for his discharge. Under Utah law, an 
employer bears the burden of showing: (1) the employee's knowledge of expected 
I 
conduct; (2) that the offending conduct within the employee's power and capacity 
to control; and (3) culpability. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202 (Supp. 
1997). In this case, the first prong is satisfied by the ALJ's findings that Autoliv 
had "initiated an alcohol and drug abuse policy to provide a drug free workplace" 
and that Edwards was aware of this policy. [R. 124] The second prong is satisfied < 
because Edwards' decision to use illegal drugs was clearly within his control. 
Finally, the third prong is satisfied by Edwards' confession and other evidence | 
because this Court has held that an employee's consumption of illegal drugs, 
whether on or off duty, is culpable conduct. See Johnson v. Department of 
Employment Security. 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the Board's decision because Autoliv has established 
Edwards' knowledge, culpability, and control over the conduct for which he was 
justly discharged. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE THE BOARD'S DECISION 
BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONDUCT AT 
THE HEARING WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
This Court should remand this case for a second administrative hearing 
because the administrative law judge's comments and conduct gave rise to the 
appearance of bias and prejudice, thereby depriving Autoliv of a fair hearing. The 
Utah Supreme Court has instructed that every person "at a hearing before an 
admimstrative agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair 
tribunal." Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah 
1987) (reversing decision of Industrial Commission because the administrative law 
judge's conduct at the hearing was not impartial). "Fairness requires not only an 
absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. 
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1985)). 
The administrative law judge's conduct in this case should inspire the same 
judicial response as in Bunnell. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and 
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i 
remanded after finding that the administrative law judge's conduct had been 
i 
unacceptable because, inter alia, (1) the judge gave the appearance of having 
decided the case without even considering vital evidence; (2) the judge excluded 
hearsay evidence that should have been admitted; and (3) the judge created an 
atmosphere in which one side's witnesses were inhibited and intimidated. Id. In 
the present case, the administrative law judge made inappropriate comments, i 
disproportionately badgered the employer's witnesses, appeared to reject 
admissible nonhearsay evidence, refused to consider mitigating factors concerning . 
the availability of vital evidence, and gave the impression that he had decided the 
case before the close of the hearing. Reasonable people, under these 
4 
circumstances, could conclude that the hearing was tainted by the possibility of 
unfairness. 
The administrative law judge's conduct was far from ideal. On at least one 
occasion, the judge appeared to coach the claimant to deny having used cocaine. 
For example, during a discussion about Edwards' confession to Gunnell, the judge i 
commented—before Edwards testified but with Edwards present—that "I'm just 
really guessing Mr. Edwards isn't going to testify that he was using cocaine. . . . g 
I'm almost going to bet you that he's not going to tell me that he was using 
cocaine." [R. 32,31:27-32] This comment appeared to be more than a simple 
I 
prediction: it carried the message, whether intended or not, that the judge believed 
Edwards did not use cocaine—or, at minimum, that Edwards should not tell the 
ALJ that he had used cocaine. Furthermore, it is telling that the judge did not 
bother to win his bet. When the time came to question Edwards, the judge never 
even asked him directly whether he had used cocaine. 
The judge also gave the impression that he had drawn conclusions and 
discounted evidence before the close of the hearing. For example, at one juncture 
the judge claimed that "[w]e have no evidence that there was any cocaine in his 
system," even though Autoliv had already introduced evidence that (1) Edwards 
had confessed to Gunnell that he had used cocaine; and (2) a drug testing report 
indicated that Edwards had tested positive on a drug/alcohol screen. [R. 32,31:27, 
16:40-41, 31:24-25; R. 1]. The judge's apparent disregard for Autoliv's evidence 
of Edwards' cocaine use seemed susceptible to two interpretations: either the judge 
had excluded Gunnell's statement from evidence as hearsay, or the judge had 
already made up his mind about the outcome. 
There also seemed to be a disparity in the judge's treatment of the parties 
and their witnesses. Edwards was represented by counsel at the hearing, whereas 
Autoliv was represented by a non-lawyer. Interestingly, the judge treated the non-
represented party to significantly tougher questioning. For example, the judge's 
queries of Phillips—an attorney who apparently missed the deadline for filing the 
appeal—was mild and restrained. In contrast, when Autoliv's representative tried 
11 
i 
to explain that the plant closure had made it impossible to secure the chain of 
< 
custody report, the judge made no allowance for the problem, despite having been 
notified of problem nine days before the hearing.7 Worse, the judge decided to 
"make part of the record" the fact that Autoliv's in-house counsel, who was not 
even present, had previously handled several drug testing cases and thus 
presumably knew that the chain of custody report was vital evidence. [R. 32, 4 
24:30-32] These comments alone do not mean that the judge was actually biased, 
but a reasonable person might question the judge's impartiality. For this reason, as -
in Bunnell, the judge's conduct warrants reversal and remand of the case to a 
second administrative law judge. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should dismiss Edwards' application for 
unemployment compensation. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals should 
remand this action for hearing before another administrative law judge. 
7
 The hearing was conducted at the height of the General Motors strike that shut 
down Autoliv's plant, and Autoliv notified the judge nine days in advance of the 
hearing that it was having difficulty collecting key evidence. [R. 31] When the 
hearing date arrived before an end to the strike, Autoliv's representatives 
explained the problem to the judge and showed that Autoliv had taken reasonable 
steps to collect the needed evidence. Nevertheless, the judge refused to keep the 
record open to receive the evidence upon conclusion of the strike. 
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475 WORKFORCE INFORMATION AND PAYMENT SERVICES R994-406-311 (10/97) 
interested parties with a clear statement of the right of 
further appeal or judicial review. 
R994-406-308. Good Cause for Not Filing Within Time 
Limitations. 
(1) A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is 
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. 
Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is shown 
that: 
(a) the appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt 
of the decision if such receipt was beyond the original 
appeal period and not the result of willful neglect; or 
(b) the delay in filing the appeal was due to circum-
stances beyond the control of the appellant; or 
(c) the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circum-
stances which were compelling and reasonable. 
R994-406-309. Procedure for Filing an Appeal. 
An appeal must be filed in writing by mailing a signed 
letter to the mailing address of the Appeals Tribunal as 
shown on the notice of decision, or submitting a written 
statement at an employment center. The appeal must be 
signed by an interested party who has a right to notice of a 
determination unless it can be shown that the interested 
party has conveyed in writing the authority to another 
person to act in his behalf, or he is physically or mentally 
incapable of acting in his own behalf. The statement of 
appeal should give the date and issue of the decision being 
appealed, the social security number of any claimant 
involved, the employer number or case number of the 
decision, a statement of the intent of the appeal and the 
facts or reasons which support the request. However, the 
failure of an appellant to include such information will not 
preclude the acceptance of an appeal. The scope of review 
will not be limited to the issues or contentions stated in the 
appeal. If the Department has begun payment of benefits 
to a claimant, such payments will not be discontinued 
pending the outcome of an appeal even if the claimant is 
willing to waive his right to payment. However, if benefits 
are denied as a result of the appeal an overpayment may be 
established in accordance with provisions of either Subsec-
tion 35A-4-406(4) or 35A-4-406(5). 
R994-406-310. Reasonable Opportunity for Fair 
Hearing. 
(1) Notice. 
(a) All interested parties will be notified by mail at least 
seven days prior to the hearing of: 
(i) the time and place, or conditions of the hearing, 
(ii) the legal issues, 
(iii) the consequences of not appearing, and 
(iv) the procedures and limitations for requesting re-
scheduling. 
(b) When a new issue arises during the hearing or under 
other unusual circumstances, advance written notice may 
be waived by the parties after a full verbal explanation of 
the issues and potential results. 
(c) It is the responsibility of the parties to a hearing to 
notify any representatives or witnesses of the time and 
place of the hearing and to make necessary arrangements 
for their participation. 
(d) If a party has designated a person or professional 
organization as his agent, notice of hearings will be sent to 
that agent and when such notice is sent, it will be consid-
ered that the party has been given notice. 
(e) If an interpreter is needed by any parties or their 
witnesses, the party should arrange for an interpreter who 
is an adult with fluent ability to understand and speak 
English and the language of the person testifying, or notify 
the Appeals Office at the time the appeal is filed (or when 
notification is given that an appeal has been filed) that 
assistance is required in arranging for an interpreter. 
(9.) Hfif lr incr n f Annpo l 
(a) All hearings will be conducted informally and in such 
manner as to protect the rights of the parties. All issues 
relevant to the appeal will be considered and passed upon. 
The decision of the Appeals Referee hereafter referred to as 
Administrative Law Judge, will be based solely on the 
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. 
(b) All testimony of witnesses will be given under oath. 
Any party to an appeal will be given an adequate opportu-
nity to be heard and present any pertinent evidence of 
probative value and to know and rebut by cross-examina-
tion or otherwise any other evidence submitted. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge will direct the order of testimony 
and rule on the admissibility of evidence. Oral or written 
evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the 
legal rules of evidence, may be accepted and will be given 
its proper weight. However, no finding of fact will be based 
solely on contested hearsay. Any official records of the 
Department, including reports submitted in connection 
with the administration of the Employment Security Act 
may be included in the record. The Administrative Law 
Judge may take such additional evidence as is deemed 
necessary. 
(c) The parties to an appeal, with consent of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge, may stipulate to the facts involved. 
The Adininistrative Law Judge may decide the appeal on 
the basis of such facts, or in his discretion, may set the 
appeal for hearing and take such further evidence as 
deemed necessary to determine the appeal. 
(d) The Administrative Law Judge may require portions 
of the evidence to be transcribed as necessary for rendering 
a decision. 
R994-406-311. Reschedule and Adjournment of Hear-
ings. 
(1) The Administrative Law Judge may, at his discretion, 
adjourn, continue or reopen a hearing on his own motion. 
The ALJ may also reschedule on his own motion if it 
appears necessary to take continuing jurisdiction based on 
a mistake as to facts or if the denial of a hearing would be 
an affront to fairness. 
(2) Prior to the Hearing. 
(a) A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may 
be rescheduled or postponed for reasonable cause if the 
request is made to the Administrative Law Judge orally or 
in writing before the hearing is concluded. Such a request 
may be made by any interested party, however, more than 
one continuance will not normally be granted if it ad-
versely impacts on the other party's rights to benefits or 
potential liability for benefit costs. 
(b) When a hearing has been canceled at the request of 
one of the parties a decision will be issued. 
(3) If one of the parties fails to appear at the hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge will, unless there is cause for 
continuance, issue a decision based on the available evi-
dence. 
(4) After the Hearing. 
(a) Any party who fails to participate personally or by 
authorized representative at a hearing before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge may, within seven days after the sched-
uled date of the hearing, make a written request for 
reopening of the hearing. Such petition will be granted if 
good cause is shown for failing to participate. A request for 
reopening made after the scheduled hearing must be in 
writing; it must state the reason(s) believed to constitute 
good cause for failing to participate at the hearing; and it 
must be delivered or mailed within a seven-day period to 
the Appeals office or to a Job Service office in any state. If 
the request for reopening is not filed within seven days, 
reopening will not be granted unless the party can show 
good cause for failing to make the request within the 
seven-day time limitation. If a request for reopening is not 
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EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 35A-4-406 
affected by claimant's refusal to work at par- tion for continued employment, 15 A.L.R.5th 
ticular times or on particular shifts for domes- 653. 
tic or family reasons, 2 A.L.R.5th 475. Employee's control or ownership of corpora-
Unemployment compensation claimant's eli- tion as precluding receipt of benefits under 
gibility as affected by loss of, or failure to state unemployment compensation provisions, 
obtain, license, certificate, or similar qualifica- 23 A.L.R.5th 176. 
35A-4-406. Claims for benefits — Continuing jurisdiction 
— Appeal — Notice of decision — Repayment of 
benefits fraudulently received. 
(1) (a) Claims for benefits shall be made and shall be determined by the 
division or referred to an administrative law judge in accordance with 
rules adopted by the department. 
(b) Each employer shall post and maintain in places readily accessible 
to individuals in his service printed statements concerning benefit rights, 
claims for benefits, and the other matters relating to the administration of 
this chapter as prescribed by rule of the department. 
(c) Each employer shall supply to individuals in his service copies of the 
printed statements or other materials relating to claims for benefits when 
and as the department may by rule prescribe. The printed statements and 
other materials shall be supplied by the division to each employer without 
cost to the employer. 
(2) (a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous. 
(b) Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, the 
division may on the basis of change in conditions or because of a mistake 
as to facts, review a decision allowing or disallowing in whole or in part a 
claim for benefits. 
(c) The review shall be conducted in accordance with rules adopted by 
the department and may result in a new decision that may award, 
terminate, continue, increase, or decrease benefits, or may result in a 
referral of the claim to an appeal tribunal. 
(d) Notice of any redetermination shall be promptly given to the party 
applying for redetermination and to other parties entitled to notice of the 
original determination, in the manner prescribed in this section with 
respect to notice of an original determination. 
(e) The new order shall be subject to review and appeal as provided in 
this section. 
(f) A review may not be made after one year from the date of the 
original determination, except in cases of fraud or claimant fault as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(3) (a) The claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination 
as provided by department rule may file an appeal from the determination 
with the Division of Adjudication within ten days after the date of mailing 
of the notice of determination or redetermination to the party's last-known 
address or, if the notice is not mailed, within ten days after the date of 
delivery of the notice. 
(b) Unless the appeal or referral is withdrawn with permission of the 
administrative law judge, after affording the parties reasonable opportu-
nity for a fair hearing, the administrative law judge shall make findings 
and conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify, or reverse the determi-
nation or redetermination. 
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(c) The administrative law judge shall first give notice of the pendency 
of an appeal to the division, which may then be a party to the proceedings. 
The administrative law judge shall receive into the record of the appeal 
any documents or other records provided by the division, and may obtain 
or request any additional documents or records held by the division or any 
of the parties that the administrative law judge considers relevant to the 
proper determination of the appeal. 
(d) The parties shall be promptly notified of the administrative law 
judge's decision and shall be furnished with a copy of the decision and the 
findings and conclusions in support of the decision. 
(e) The decision is considered to be final unless, within 30 days after the 
date of mailing of notice and a copy of the decision to the party's 
last-known address, or in the absence of mailed notice, within 30 days 
after the delivery of the notice, further appeal is initiated in accordance 
with Section 35A-4-508 and Chapter 1, Part 3, Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(4) (a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as 
benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the 
sum to the division for the fund. 
(b) If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received any sum as 
benefits under this chapter to which under a redetermination or decision 
pursuant to this section he has been found not entitled, he shall repay the 
sum, or shall, in the discretion of the division, have the sum deducted from 
any future benefits payable to him, or both. 
(c) In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is liable to 
repay to the division any sum for the fund, the sum shall be collectible in 
the same manner as provided for contributions due under this chapter. 
(5) (a) If any person has received any sum as benefits under this chapter to 
which under a redetermination or decision he was not entitled, and it has 
been found that he was without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay 
the sum but shall be liable to have the sum deducted from any future 
benefits payable to him. 
(b) The division may waive recovery of the overpayment if it is shown to 
the satisfaction of the division that the claimant has the inability to meet 
more than the basic needs of survival for an indefinite period lasting at 
least several months. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 6; C. 1943, ence and other stylistic changes. 
42-2a-6; L. 1949, ch. 53, § 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1; The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1976, ch. 19, § 3; 1989, ch. renumbered this section, which formerly ap-
120, § 3; 1990, ch. 255, § 1; 1993, ch. 241, § 2; peared as § 35-4-406; substituted "division" for 
C. 1953, 35-4-6; renumbered by L. 1994, ch. "commission or its authorized representative" 
169, § 35; C. 1953, 35-4-406; renumbered by and "department" for "commission" in Subsec-
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 239. tion (l)(a) and made similar and related 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- changes throughout; in Subsection (3)(a), in-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, revised the subsec- serted "by department rule" and "of determina-
tion designations to substitute numbers for tion or redetermination" and substituted "the 
letters, correcting an internal reference accord- Division of Adjudication" for "an administrative 
ingly; in Subsection (3), inserted "first" in the law judge"; added "or redetermination" at the 
second sentence of the second paragraph and end of Subsection (3)(b); added the second sen-
substituted "30 days" for "ten days" in the tence of Subsection (3)(c); in Subsection (3)(e), 
second sentence of the third paragraph; and inserted "and a copy of the decision" and sub-
made stylistic changes throughout the section. stituted "30 days" for "ten days" and "35A-4-508 
The 1994 amendment, effective October 2, and Chapter 1, Part 3, Adjudicative Proceed-
1994, renumbered this section, which formerly ings" for "35-4-508" in Subsection (3)(e); and 
appeared as § 35-4-6, and made related refer- made stylistic changes. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic 
Servs., Inc. v. University of Utah, 801 F. Supp. 
508 (D. Utah 1990). 
CHAPTER 46b 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Section 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chap-
ter. 
63-46b-2. Definitions. 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative 
proceedings. 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative pro-
ceedings as informal — Stan-
dards — Undesignated pro-
ceedings formal. 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Respon-
sive pleadings. 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Discovery 
and subpoenas. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Hearing 
procedure. 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Interven-
tion. 
Section 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Orders. 
63-46b-ll. Default. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsidera-
tion. 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal ad-
judicative proceedings. 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adju-
dicative proceedings. 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and 
other temporary remedies 
pending final disposition. 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act." 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-0.5, enacted by 
L. 1991, ch. 87, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, The Fraught Rejection of the Current Tbrt System, 
Utah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem- 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by 
a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this 
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and 
govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
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persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, 
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of these actions. 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial review of 
those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the 
decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of and 
penalties or interest on taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment, 
except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a 
taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or 
correctness of those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of 
pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the 
rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and 
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, 
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the 
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or 
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah 
State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in the 
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on 
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reas-
sign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational 
institution, or judicial review of those actions; 
(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within 
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those 
actions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 34A, Chapter 
6, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 55, 
Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, except that this chapter governs 
any agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person 
authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation or 
assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the 
management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets, 
and contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies, 
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for an agency of the state, 
except as provided in those contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and 
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions; and Title 7, Chapter 2, 
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner; Title 7, Chapter 19, 
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or Holding Companies; and 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review 
of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
benefits under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation, and Title 
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the initial determina-
tion of a person's unemployment tax liability; 
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(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of mon-
etary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, develop-
ment, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Title 26, 
Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act; Title 19, 
Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act; Title 19, Chapter 3, Radiation Control 
Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water Act; Title 19, Chapter 5, 
Water Quality Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground Storage Tank Act; or Title 
19, Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act, except that this chapter 
governs any agency action commenced by any person authorized by law to 
contest the validity or correctness of the notice or order; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or 
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government 
or public assistance benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and 
certificates of registration; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative pro-
ceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested 
persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the 
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not 
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting 
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any 
provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to 
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of 
those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary 
to prevent the denial. 
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(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature 
at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, 
for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-l, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 257; 1988, ch. 72, § 15; 1990, 
ch. 306, § 2; 1991, ch. 207, § 39; 1991, ch. 
212, § 5; 1991, ch. 259, § 51; 1992, ch. 30, 
§ 128; 1992, ch. 280, § 57; 1992, ch. 303, 
§ 12;1993,ch.91,§ 1; 1994, ch. 40, § 4; 1994, 
ch. 200, § 86; 1994, ch. 297, § 13; 1995, ch. 
299, § 38; 1996, ch. 20, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, 
§ 354; 1997, ch. 375, § 304. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch. 40, effective May 2, 1994, substi-
tuted "Utah Occupational Disease Act" for 
"Utah Occupational Disability Law" in Subsec-
tion (2)(i); substituted "Title 19, Chapter 2, Air 
Conservation Act" for "Title 19, Chapter 5, 
Water Quality Act" and "Title 19, Chapter 5, 
Water Quality Act" for "Title 19, Chapter 2, Air 
Conservation Act, or" and inserted "or Title 19, 
Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act" 
in Subsection (2)(k); and made stylistic and 
punctuation changes throughout the section. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 200, effective 
June 1,1994, deleted "Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah 
Industrial Loan Corporation Guaranty Act," 
near the middle of Subsection (2)(h) and made 
stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 297, effective 
July 1, 1994, made stylistic and punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(f), (h), (i), and (k) 
and inserted "or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Educational institution proceedings. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Time periods. 
—Extension of deadline. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
The judicial review provisions of this chapter 
governed an appeal from an order of the De-
partment of Transportation denying plaintiff 
sign company's application for a permit to erect 
a sign on the ground that the application was 
for a location that was not lawful. Utah Sign, 
Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 896 P.2d 632 
(Utah 1995). 
Underground Storage Tank Act" in Subsection 
(2)(k). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
deleted "except that this chapter governs any 
agency's final action commenced by any person 
pursuant to Section 65A-1-7" after "trust land 
assets" in Subsection (2)(g). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 20, effective 
April 29, 1996, added "Title 19, Chapter 3, 
Radiation Control Act" in Subsection (2)(k). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 240, effective 
July 1, 1997, substituted "35A" for "35" in 
Subsections (2)(f) and (i), "6" for "9" in Subsec-
tion (2)(f), and "3" for "1" and "3a" for "2" in 
Subsection (2)(i). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
substituted "Title 34A" for "Title 35A" in Sub-
section (2)(f) and "Title 34A, Chapter 2" for 
"Title 35A, Chapter 3" and "Title 34A, Chapter 
3" for "Title 35A, Chapter 3a" in Subsection 
(2)(i). 
Coordination clause. — Laws 1996, ch. 
240, which amends this section effective July 1, 
1997, provides in § 379 that the amendments 
by that act shall be merged with amendments 
by any other acts if they can be merged without 
conflict, except that references to the Industrial 
Commission shall be replaced with "depart-
ment." 
Educational institution proceedings. 
District court correctly determined it did not 
have jurisdiction under this chapter to review 
college parking committee's decision upholding 
fine for failing to have disabled placard visible 
while parked in a handicapped zone. The plain 
language of Subsection (2)(d) of this section 
exempts from this chapter actions relating to 
student discipline in any educational institu-
tion and nothing in Utah Const., Art. VIII, § 5 
gives district courts appellate jurisdiction over 
such decisions. Wisden v. Dixie College Parking 
Comm., 935 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Extraordinary writs. 
Because, under § 78-2a-3, the Court of Ap-
peals has appellate jurisdiction over adjudica-
tive proceedings of state agencies, and because 
this section preserves the availability of ex-
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ADDENDUM 2 
Transcript of July 7,1998 
Administrative Hearing 
Before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
LEGAL SECTION 
In the Matter of the 
claim of 
JON C. EDWARDS, S.S.A. NO, 
528-88-9360 
for 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
Hearing conducted in the Employment Center at 480 - 27th Street, 
Ogden, Utah on July 7, 1998; same being pursuant to Notice of the 
Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Workforce Services• 
Before HON. NORMAN BARNES 
Administrative Law Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
JON C. EDWARDS, 
Claimant, 
RANDALL G. PHILLIPS, 
Claimant Representative 
PAM GUNNELL, 
Employer 
DR. LEE POTTER, 
Witness 
VALERIE STICE, 
Employer Representative 
Reported by Debbie A. Neeley 
000032 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
We're on record in the matter of the claim of Jon C. Edwards, 
social security count number 528-88-9360. This hearing is being 
conducted in the Ogden Department of Workforce Services Appeals 
Office located at 480 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah. The date of 
the hearing is July 7, 1998. It is approximately 8:05 a.m. The 
Administrative Law Judge in this matter is Norman Barnes. The 
record will show the claimant is present at the hearing. The 
claimant is being represented at the hearing by Randall 
Phillips, Attorney at Law. The employer Autoliv ASP is being 
represented at the hearing by Valerie Stice, Hearing Consultant 
with the Gibbens Company. Present in behalf of the employer as 
a potential witness is Pam Gunnel1. 
This hearing then relates to a Department Representative's 
decision dated June 10, 1998. That decision denied the claimant 
unemployment insurance benefits effective April 12, 1998, and 
relieved the employer of benefit costs associated with that 
claim on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his 
employment with Autoliv ASP for disqualifying reasons, for just 
cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
The claimant has subsequently filed an appeal through his 
attorney in this matter in a letter dated June 11, 1998. It's 
indicated in my preliminary information that the original 
decision was dated June 10, 1998. I'm just going to briefly 
look through the file because it would be my impression that 
that would not be the date of the original decision of the 
Department in this particular case. (short pause) It would 
appear to me the original decision was issued on May 22, 1998. 
There are actually two decision issued on that date. One 
denying the claimant unemployment insurance benefits on the 
basis of the job separation, and a second decision establishing 
a $717.00 overpayment, holding the claimant to be at fault in 
the creation of that overpayment. The decision then remailed 
May 22, 1998, would mean that I have before me also a timeliness 
issue. I'll be taking testimony first from the claimant 
regarding that timeliness issue. Timeliness is a jurisdictional 
issue. If the claimant is unable to establish good cause for 
filing a late appeal I would actually lack jurisdiction as far 
as ruling on the merits of the case. The Department in this 
particular case has ruled the claimant was discharged from his 
employment. As we go into the separation issue the employer, as 
the moving party in a discharge case, would have the burden of 
proof to establish the circumstances involved in the job 
separation. In order to establish just cause for termination 
the employer would have to show the existence of the elements of 
knowledge, culpability and control in connection with 
employment. Knowledge is in reference to whether or not the 
employee had information, had knowledge of the expectations of 
the employer as related to whatever issue created the 
separation. Culpability goes to whether or not there was actual 
or potential harm to the employer as a result of the claimant's 
actions or inactions. Control goes to whether or not the 
situation was within the individual's control. Giving you just 
a brief synopsis of those elements that make up just case. If 
you had additional questions regarding those elements please 
feel free to ask questions regarding those elements as we 
proceed through the hearing. 
I'll take testimony first from the claimant regarding the 
timeliness issue. If we get into the separation issue then I'll 
take testimony first from the employer regarding that separation 
issue. I'll give the claimant an opportunity to cross-examine 
the employer witness or witnesses or to give any rebuttal 
response regarding testimony offered by the employer, allowing 
the employer the same opportunity to cross-examine the claimant 
or give any rebuttal response regarding testimony he may provide 
in this case. 
At issue then in the hearing before me then are the following. 
Number one the timeliness of the appeal filed by the claimant. 
Number two whether or not on the basis of the job separation the 
claimant is eligible to receive benefits. The third issue is 
whether the employer should be relieved of benefit costs, and a 
fourth intendant issue is whether the claimant has received 
benefits to which he was not entitled, and if so whether he was 
at fault in the creation of an overpayment in this particular 
case. With that in mind then as far as the issues pending 
before me and order of hearing let me get an introduction from 
the parties beginning with the claimant. If you would state 
your full name, your current living address. We'll have your 
representative identify himself for the record. Employer 
representatives if you would then give you names and position 
titles. 
Okay my name is Jon Edwards, and I live at 1686 Rushton Street. 
Attorney Randall Garth Phillips, Attorney for the Claimant. 
We have 505 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84403 as your mailing 
address is that correct Mr. Phillips? 
That's correct. 
My name is Valerie Stice. I'm a hearing representative for the 
Gibbens Company. 
Pam Gunnell, I'm a Human Resource Supervisor with Autoliv. 
As part of the hearing process both parties should have received 
a copy of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Information 
Brochure. It's a document explaining-- (phone ringing) Let's 
see why I'm getting this interruption. Judge Barnes. May I 
help you? (phone hanging up) Wrong number I'm guessing. As 
part of the hearing process then both parties should have 
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received a copy of Unemployment Insurance Appeals Information 
Brochure, a document explaining your rights and 
responsibilities, including the fact that you could be 
represented at the hearing by legal counsel. I'm showing the 
parties a copy of the referenced document. Mr. Phillips any 
questions the claimant would have regarding rights and 
responsibilities at this hearing? 
No your honor. 
Any questions the employer would have regarding rights and 
responsibilities Ms. Stice? 
No. 
Both parties should have received copies of documents relating 
to the issues pending before me. Did the claimant receive 
copies of documents Mr. Phillips? 
Yes sir. 
And did the employer receive copies of documents Ms. Stice? 
Yes we did. 
I have before document I have labeled as Exhibits 1 through 13 
and Exhibit A. I'm going to review the documents at this time 
with the parties. I'll identify what the documents are, what 
they contain. If you have any questions regarding the documents 
feel free to ask questions regarding the documents. After I've 
identified the documents I'll ask if either party has objections 
to the documents being entered as evidence. Exhibit No. 1 is a 
five-page, actually a six-page document which would be 
identified then as the claimant's letter of appeal filed through 
his legal counsel, Randall Phillips. Did you complete this 
documentation Mr. Phillips? 
Yes I did. 
Exhibit No. 2 is a Department Decision for Eligibility dated May 
21, 1998, wherein the claimant was advised that he had been 
found eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits as he 
was found to be not at fault in the discharge from his work. 
Exhibit No. 3 is a Department Decision mailed May 22, 1998, 
advising the claimant that he had been disqualified from 
receiving benefits on the grounds that he was discharged for 
disqualifying reasons. Exhibit 4 is an overpayment decision 
dated May 22, 1998. The claimant was advised of a $1,700, 
excuse me, a $717.00 overpayment, that he was considered to be 
at fault in the creation of that overpayment. Exhibit No. 5 is 
a two-page computer printout of a Telephone Claim filed for 
benefits filed by the claimant on April 14, 1998, wherein he 
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reported as his last employer Autoliv ASP. Do you recall 
completing that telephone claim for benefits Mr. Edwards? (no 
response) Did you file a telephone claim in April? 
No. Oh for the unemployment? 
That's correct. 
Yes. 
Exhibit No. 6 is a Claimant Information document identifying 
that the claimant received total benefits in the amount of 
$717.00. This is actually a computerized document on Utah 
Department of Workforce Services letterhead identifying that the 
claimant had filed for and received benefits totaling $717.00. 
Exhibit 17 is a Client Statement. It's on a form 615C. It's 
dated May 26. It's the Department Representative's reasoning 
statement as far as disqualifying the claimant from receiving 
benefits. Exhibit No. 8 is a Claimant Information Fact Finding 
Statement dated April 14
 f 1998, where it identified then 
information then the claimant provided at the time he originally 
filed his Claim for Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Then 
there's some additional information on the document, handwritten 
information regarding the Department Representative's attempts 
to contact the employer as far as obtaining additional 
information regarding the circumstances involved in the job 
separation. Exhibit No. 9 is the Claimant Statement of Job 
Discharge, a statement dated April 17# 1998, wherein the 
claimant provided information as it relates to the reasons for 
separation from Autoliv. Did you sign this document Mr. Edward? 
Yes I did. 
Exhibit No. 10 is a document, a letter on Gibbens Company 
letterhead dated April 28, 1998, where the employer provides 
information regarding the circumstances involved in the job 
separation. Exhibit No. 11 is a letter on Autoliv letterhead 
dated April 7, 1998, addressed to Jon C. Edwards regarding his 
involuntary separation. It shows to be signed by Pam Gunnel1. 
Ms. Gunnell did you sign this document? 
Yes I did. 
Exhibit No. 12 is a typewritten letter dated April 8, 1998. It 
shows a signator space identifying regards Lisa, and I can't 
read the last name on it. It looks i-r-a-r-y, but there's at 
least one letter missing that I cannot read. Exhibit No. 13 
shows to be a Drug Test Report. It looks like it's signed by a 
Lee H. Potter, and it shows the report date as 4/6 of '98. 
Exhibit A then is faxed documents. It was received in the 
Appeals Section June 29, 1998. It's documentation submitted by 
the Gibbens Company. There's a cover letter, there's a letter 
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dated October 26, 1996, addressed to a Jon Edwards. There is 
then a Notice of Caution letter with a date of 10/24 of '96. 
There is documentation then on Autoliv letterhead with respect 
to an alcohol and drug abuse program. There's a letter dated 
May 1, 1997, showing to go to all employees, subject, "Drug and 
Alcohol Testing Policy." There's an additional page which 
appears to be an excerpt then from the Employee Handbook as it 
relates to employee assistance program, alcohol and drugs, 
business ethics. There's then a letter from a Dick Shimabukuro 
going to Roxann Christensen, a copy going to Valerie Stice at 
the Gibbens Company. 
I think that one was sent in error your honor. 
It's a letter dated June 29, 1998. Again it would appear to 
reference this case Ms. Stice. 
It does. It was just a request for a document. 
And that appears to be the contents then of Exhibit A. I've 
identified for the record referenced documents Exhibits 1 
through 13 and Exhibit A. Mr. Phillips does the claimant have 
any objection to any of these documents being entered as 
evidence? 
We may have an objection to 13 the drug test on a foundational 
basis. (Indiscernible) evidence based on the fact that we don't 
have the actual individual here to testify that they actually 
did that drug test. 
Your honor we do have Dr. Potter available by telephone. 
The document in and of itself is, this particular document I've 
never seen this type of document submitted by a drug testing 
laboratory. This document itself, and Dr. Potter, where is Dr. 
Potter from Ms. Stice? 
I believe he is at Work Med. 
Well and we're getting some comments from Mr. Edwards and some 
comments from Ms. Gunnell and I really just posed the question 
to Ms. Stice. As far as you know then the doctor is not 
affiliated with the laboratory is that correct? 
He's the MRO. He's the MRO. 
Okay, but as far as the MRO do you know whether or not the test 
was conducted by a laboratory or was conducted by the--by the--
I think (overtalking-indiscernible) toxicology did the test. 
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In and of itself, so that you understand Mr. Phillips, and Ms. 
Stice understands on behalf of the employer Exhibit 13 as far as 
I'm concerned is a hearsay document/ and I'll treat it as such. 
Hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings. So 
as far as the admissibility there still is a question, and I 
understand where you're going Mr. Phillips there is a 
foundational question as far as Exhibit 13. But as far as the 
foundation on that particular document I'm not going to give any 
more or less weight to the document on the basis of foundation 
where it's hearsay. Now if the employer is purporting it to be 
more than hearsay then the employer would have to establish 
through--through foundation that the document would then be 
competent evidence. I'm treating the document at this point as 
hearsay evidence and on that basis I'll overrule your objection 
to the submissability. Again I would determine what weight, if 
any# to give that hearsay documentation. Any other objections 
to the documents being entered as evidence Mr. Phillips? 
No your honor. 
Ms. Stice any objections the employer would have to referenced 
documents Exhibits 1 through 13 or Exhibit A being entered as 
evidence? 
I do not. 
I'll receive then as evidence in this matter Exhibits 1 through 
13 and Exhibit A as they have been labeled. 
As was stated I'll begin by taking testimony in this matter from 
the claimant regarding the timeliness issue. I'll swear the 
claimant for testimony if you would raise your right hand to be 
sworn. Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you will 
give herein will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth? 
Yes. 
Thank you. Again would you state your name for the record. 
Jon Clark Edwards. 
Mr. Edwards I need to discuss with you first of all a timeliness 
issue as it relates to decisions mailed to you by the Department 
in this particular matter. I want to ask you some--some 
questions that I feel are relevant as it relates to the 
timeliness issue. What's your educational level Mr. Edwards? 
Two years of college. 
Do you have any problems reading or understanding written 
English? 
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I'm not asking that question to be facetious, but many times we 
have individuals that don't and that's why I ask that question. 
I call your attention to Exhibits 2, 3 and 4# which are the 
Department Decisions. Did you receive copies of these decisions 
Mr. Edwards ? 
Yes I did. 
Approximately when would you have received the decisions? 
I think I wrote a letter back to them and I finally got the 
information, it was a couple of weeks after. 
You say you wrote a letter to the Department? 
To--To--I wrote a letter to Autoliv to Lisa Frary trying to get 
my job back. Is this what you're talking about? 
I'm referring to these decisions that denied you unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
Oh yes I did get them. 
And did you understand from receiving the documents--What did 
you understand from receiving the documents regarding your 
eligibility? 
The first one I got said that I qualified for it and they gave 
me seven hundred and something dollars and then sent a thing 
right back that said they wanted the money back. 
And what did you do as far as clarifying that situation? 
Went straight to him. 
Referring to Mr.--
Mr. Phillips here. 
And when did you first go to Mr. Phillips? 
Boy# I don't know the date. 
How long after you received these decisions did you go to Mr. 
Phillips? 
I had already been to him before I--They hadn't made a decision 
to get me anything yet so I went to him to find out what^  was 
going on. In the meantime they had sent me a deal said I 
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qualified and gave the $700, and then they come back and wanted 
it back. 
Well when you got the notification that they wanted the money 
back when did you go to Mr. Phillips? How long after receiving 
that documentation? 
The very next day. 
And what did Mr. Phillips advise you to do? 
He said we'll just try to# we're going to put in a file and see 
if we can get it back. 
If I could address the court here in this matter, this is a--an 
extraordinary, unusual situation whereas the employee was 
granted benefits on May 21st and subsequently on May 22nd he 
received a--a letter indicating that his benefits were denied, 
and there was nothing to indicate that this was a--in any regard 
a nunc pro tunc or any sort of, there was absolutely no 
explanation as to why he was originally granted the benefits and 
then denied the benefits the exact same day and also given 
demand, the agency also demanded payment, so if there was any 
delay in the matter submitted, it was based upon, there was a 
fair amount of research to look into this--this issue as to how 
the agency can go through the, make a decision and go through 
and you know laterally make a decision overruling itself without 
any input whatsoever by the employer, it was basically the 
individual acting on its own. 
Well again that's why I'm asking Mr. Edwards questions as to 
what he did as far as resolving the matter, and if you have 
additional input and you wish to be sworn as a witness Mr. 
Phillips I have no problems with you representing the claimant 
and also being a witness if you have privy to--to the 
information that caused the appeal to be late. Anything further 
then you did as far as clarifying your situation or--or 
clarifying with the Department whether or not you owed them any 
money Mr. Edwards? 
He--He did that for me. 
Referring to Mr. Phillips? 
Mr. Phillips, yes. 
Mr. Phillips do you have any additional questions of the 
claimant regarding the timeliness issues? 
No I don't. 
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Do you have questions of the witness regarding the timeliness 
issue Ms. Stice? 
I do have a question. Mr. Edwards why didn't you inquire of the 
Department why you had received the second decision instead of 
going to Mr. Phillips? 
Because I had already talked to him before when they was trying 
to get it and I was getting turned down and turned down and 
turned down and I said, "Hey what's going on?" So I had already 
been to him and he already knew about it# and there was no, I 
did go to him. He knew what was going on the whole time. 
Okay you didn't make any inquiries of the Department? 
I took all them papers down to him. 
Okay. I don't have any other questions. 
What did you intend to do then as far as providing information 
at this hearing Mr. Phillips as it relates to the timeliness 
issue? Do yo want to be sworn in this matter as a witness? 
Yes sir. 
If you'll raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly 
swear or affirm the testimony you will give herein will be the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
Yeah I do. 
Thank you. Do you have any type of record Mr. Phillips as to 
when the claimant first approached you on--on the matter of the 
overpayment and the decision denying benefits? 
I'm not sure as to the exact date as to when he came to when the 
claimant came to my office. However, I believe it was within 
the--the ten days, and I, upon reviewing the documents, as 
previously stated had to do some fairly in depth research in 
this matter. 
Well what did you do as far as researching the matter? 
I had to go--I went down to the law library and try to dig up 
any sort of legal precedent or anything there in the--the 
Administrative Rule Procedure Act, the Utah Code to see if there 
was any type of case law out there as to, or any sort of 
administrative procedure that would allow the original decision 
maker to unilaterally modify their decision. 
Well did you understand that there was a time limitation as far 
as filing an appeal? 
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Yes I did your honor. The--From what I understand is that from 
ruling that within ten days you need to file the appeal, 
however, there is, from reading the Code, it appears that there, 
the decision does not become actually final and graved in stone 
until thirty days after the original decision. And--
Where do you get the thirty days from? 
It's set forth in the Utah Code. I don't have the exact 
reference. 
Do you know what the thirty days is in reference to Mr. 
Phillips? 
I believe it is notice to a final appeal, the actual decision 
being final. 
To--To what type of decision. 
To the point where you would have to go to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. And I--And I--In this particular situation if the--if 
the appeal was filed late, and it appears that it was, there was 
actually circumstances based on the unusual circumstances. 
But if you had some questions as far as any type of legal 
questions why didn't you go directly to the Department as far as 
obtaining information regarding the--the appeal process or the 
reason he had initially been denied benefits and then been or 
been allowed benefits and then denied benefits? Why didn't you 
use the Department as a source? 
Well the--the nature of the letters that were received, I, to be 
honest with you your honor I did not know if I would be able to 
get a fair or straight answer because it's just highly unusual, 
and I've never seen in my seven years of practice where a judge 
or a decision maker or a hearing officer has granted benefits on 
the one hand and then denied benefits the very next day without 
any action whatsoever by the opposing party no ex parte type 
action. 
So why not just call the Department and get a clarification as 
to what had happened or whether it was an error on their part? 
I'm assuming I could have done so but based upon just the very 
nature of the things I was, did not believe that I could get a 
fair, straight answer from whoever made this decision. 
Well did you even know who made the decision? 
No I did not. 
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Was there any information on the documentation as to who made 
the decision? 
Dee Smart. I was just, as I say, I was just flabbergasted at 
how--how the methods were run. On day one, denied the following 
day without any particular justification or (indiscernible) or 
and there was nothing in the law that I could find that would 
allow for that. 
So what was your reasoning then as far as waiting until 
the 10th of June then to file this appeal? 
-until 
If I recall it would be a matter of, you know I would have to go 
back and look in my calendar. It would just be a nature of 
attempting to get into the law library to obtain all the 
information to see if there is any sort of any precedence out 
there that would give any indications to justification for the--
the overturning of the decision and then just drafting of the 
appeal and sending it in was as quickly as I possibly could. 
Any other testimony then you would want to give regarding the 
timeliness issue Mr. Phillips? 
No your honor. 
Questions you have of the witness Ms. Stice? 
I do have further questions. Mr. Phillips why didn't you do 
like a preliminary appeal and then, to protect the ten day limit 
and then do your research? 
My understanding of the review and looking at the Code section 
is that there was the ten days where an appeal would generally 
be filed but then the final decision would not have been thirty, 
within thirty days that decision would absolutely become final 
and (indiscernible) the Court of Appeals. 
You wouldn't have known that before you researched would you? 
Now I didn't find out until I did the research. 
Okay. When did you go to the law library? 
I would think it would be soon after, it probably would have 
been four or five days (indiscernible). 
So that would have been within the ten day limit. 
Conceivably. I, as I say, I've got on my calendar exactly what 
day I went to the law library. 
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So why didn't you do your appeal right after you went to the law 
library? 
Again I'd have to look at my calendar as to why. 
All right. I don't have any other questions. 
Did the employer intend to provide any evidence or testimony 
regarding the timeliness issue Ms. Stice? 
No. 
I'm going to defer as far as making a decision on the timeliness 
issue. There are some mitigating circumstances in this 
particular case as to how the Department has handled this 
particular matter and why the decisions were mailed as they were 
and I can't really speak any more to that than the documents 
themselves speak. I have some serious questions as to why the 
Department made their rulings the way they did in this 
particular case specifically as it relates to sections of the 
law under which the claimant was disqualified, for instance the 
overpayment and saying they held the claimant at fault in the 
creation of the overpayment. There's no evidence in the record 
to establish that the claimant ever misled the Department as to 
the reasons for his separation or that the Department did not 
have information at their disposal to identify what the 
circumstances were that caused the claimant to be separated from 
his employment. There's no documentation as to why the 
Department allowed benefits to the claimant and then denied 
benefits to the claimant because it was based on the same 
information that Department originally had received from both 
parties. I cannot tell from the documentation then why the 
Department acted as they did in this particular case in issuing 
the decisions. There's also a question as to the language of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and what time period 
there is given in order to file an appeal. On that basis I'm 
going to take the matter under consideration as far as the 
timeliness of the appeal, and I'm going to move forward as far 
as taking testimony in this case on the separation issue. I'll 
make an official ruling. Of course if I hold the claimant did 
not have good cause for filing a late appeal I would not rule on 
the merits of the case. In this particular matter at this 
particular junction there is a chance that I will be ruling in 
the claimant's favor on the timeliness issue so I'm going to go 
into the separation since we have the parties here at the 
hearing, and I want that information as part of this record. 
Also I can take continuing jurisdiction in this matter if I find 
there's a mistake as to fact or a change of conditions that 
would allow me to take continuing jurisdiction. I have no 
additional questions of the parties regarding the timeliness 
issue and I'll defer on that matter as far as making an official 
ruling. I'll give the parties a final opportunity if there's 
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anything else you want to add or say regarding the timeliness 
issue before we close that matter. Anything further the 
employer would have to add or say regarding the timeliness issue 
Ms. Stice? 
I would just add that the decision is very clear that the appeal 
needs to be done in ten days and Mr. Phillips could have done a 
preliminary appeal and then researched. He could have made 
inquiries of the Department, and also that I have seen this 
happen before with the Gibbens Company only in reverse that 
we'll get a favorable decision and then within a few days 
receive an unfavorable from the Department. And also it looks 
like it may have been that when we were able to obtain the Drug 
Test Report and submit that they made their second decision. 
Anything further the claimant would have to add or say regarding 
the timeliness issue Mr. Phillips? 
I would just point out that there are some--some very 
interesting (indiscernible) in how the decision maker actually 
wrote a decision, changed the decision and that it was a matter 
of disfairness and due process that if there's a unilateral ex 
parte decision made that the claimant should be able to have his 
opportunity before court in order to hear his side of the story. 
I'll close the hearing then with respect to the timeliness issue 
and reopen the hearing regarding the claimant's separation from 
employment. I'll take testimony at this time then from the 
employer regarding that particular issue. You intended then to 
have Pam Gunnell testify in behalf of the employer? 
Yes. 
Ms. Gunnell if you raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you 
solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you will give herein will 
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
Yes I do. 
Thank you. Ms. Gunnell the claimant reports in what has been 
marked as Exhibit No. 5 that he worked for Autoliv from 6/6 of 
'93 to 4/6 of '98. To knowledge would those be correct dates of 
employment? 
10/18 of #93 would be the hire date to 4/6/98. 
What type of work was the claimant doing for the employer at the 
time of separation? 
Production or assembly work. 
Was he considered a full time employee? 
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Yes sir. 
Who was his immediate work supervisor on that job at the time of 
separation? 
Mike Rees. 
And do you know what his pay rate was? 
$11.25 an hour. 
Was the claimant discharged by the employer Ms. Gunnell? 
Yes he was. 
And who discharged him? 
Myself. 
What reason did you give him for the dismissal action? 
For the positive results on his Drug and Alcohol Test which is 
a violation of company policy. 
Does the employer have a written Drug and Alcohol Testing 
Policy? 
Yes it does. There's information in the handbook. There's 
policy. There's written (indiscernible) that's more in depth in 
the administrative computer system, and there was a memo sent 
out in May of '97 (indiscernible) all employees. 
What is the purpose of the employer's policy? Why does--Why 
does the employer have a drug testing policy? 
We need to have a work place that is free of drugs so all 
employees can be safe. We do have moving equipment, forklifts, 
(indiscernible) people could be hurt both for themselves and for 
other employees. 
It's your position then that the employees through the various 
processes that you've identified would have knowledge then of 
actually what the employer's policy is is that correct? 
That is correct. And Jon had also signed Handbook receipts 
which the information is contained in the Handbook and he signed 
that he was responsible to be familiar with the contents. 
Tell me the nature of the policy. What--What are the contents 
of the policy as it relates to drug testing and employment 
status. 
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Okay the policy says there is a zero tolerance and that the 
first time that you are found under the illegal use of drugs or 
misuse of drugs or alcohol that it will be immediate 
termination. 
What does--Go ahead. 
We also have an open window where if someone comes forward and 
tells us they have a problem we will provide them with 
rehabilitation, counseling under which time they would be 
subject to random tests, but we would like to see our employees 
succeed and we do have in place to help them. 
Had the claimant ever come forward and participated in an 
Employee Assistance Program for drug or alcohol related 
problems? 
Yes. The employee had previously been through (indiscernible). 
And when would that have been? 
In '96, October 26 of '96 Jon Edwards was on a company business 
trip and in a rented vehicle rented by the company. He was 
charged with a DUI. A breathalizer test was performed and 
alcohol was found. He was told that he was going to be allowed 
to return to work, but he would be on a probationary status for 
one year. He would be subject to random drug tests and had to 
participate in a substance abuse treatment program. Again that 
was in October '96 and May of '97 was when the company went to 
zero tolerance where you don't get a chance first, you know you 
don't get found once and then go through treatment. At that 
point in time anybody that came up positive on a test would be 
terminated. 
Did the claimant then go through that probationary period? 
He did successfully complete the first probationary period. 
Does the employer define the legal use of drugs or alcohol in 
their policy, is that defined, what you mean by legal use of 
drugs or alcohol? 
The Medical Review Officer, Dr. Potter, who is available by 
phone, would have that definition. I do not. 
Well does your policy specify what that definition is? 
It says if it impairs them where their use adversely affects job 
performance (indiscernible) or engaged in the misuse of 
alcoholic beverages or prescription drugs on company premises or 
while on company business. 
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And specifically which provision of the drug policy then was the 
claimant terminated under? 
I was contacted that he was positive on his test which we had 
sent him for. He was sent because we had cause for suspicion. 
When did this incident take place? 
April 1. 
And by reasonable suspicion do you know what that was? 
No, but Mr. Steve Brown, Human Resource Representative will also 
be available by telephone to testify to that. 
Well has he told you what the reasonable suspicion was? 
He sent me an e-mail saying that Jon Edwards was sent for the 
test. He did not go into details. 
Well was he the one then that determined there was reasonable 
suspicion? 
Mike Rees, the supervisor, was actually the one that brought it 
to Human Resource's attention. 
Is Mr. Rees going to be testifying today Ms. Stice? 
He's the one that we expected to be here. 
Now have you talked to Mr. Rees Ms. Gunnell? 
I have talked with him. With the partial shut down I have not 
talked to him for over a week. 
Well I guess the question is before you took the termination 
action did you talk to Mr. Rees to determine what he considered 
to be reasonable suspicion? 
No. But before the termination Mr. Edwards admitted to us the 
drugs and alcohol which he had used. 
What drugs did he tell you he had been using? 
He told us that he had been to a Jazz party the night before and 
had drank a lot of alcohol, and he also indicated that he was 
upset that cocaine showed up through his MRO, which I do not get 
the results as to what he is positive for. He gave, voluntarily 
gave me that information. 
Did he tell you that he had been using cocaine? 
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Yels he did. 
Did the drug test test positive for cocaine to your knowledge? 
My knowledge would not include that. I just get a positive 
reading for drug/alcohol. 
And in this case do you know, you don't know then the substance 
that he tested positive? 
I do not know. 
Two or four. Are there other questions you have of the witness 
Ms. Stice? 
Yes I do. Ms. Gunnell do you know in Mr. Edwards position did 
he use equipment? Are you aware? 
All of our production associates are on assembly lines where 
there is different moving equipment which is presses and bag 
folders. I don't know specifically the line he was on, but 
every line has several different machines and the employees 
rotate through those machines. 
Okay and the information about the cocaine in his system, did 
you ask him about drugs or how did-- how did he come to tell you 
about that? 
When he was in my office after Dr. Potter had talked to him, the 
MR0 card had happened then Dr. Potter called my manager to tell 
us that we did have a positive. My manager immediately notified 
me. I notified his supervisor who brought Jon into my office, 
and I told him that we just received a positive result and the 
company policy is to terminate. He asked for a second chance. 
I showed him the memo, the May '97 memo that says we no longer 
give second chances. He told me he knew of another employee who 
was given five chances and he just wanted a second chance, and 
I told him I was not aware of anyone, any exception to the zero 
second chance thing. I did further look into that later and I 
still could not find any, I don't believe any employee has been 
given a second chance after the May '97 memo came out. I 
offered info on how to refute the results because he was upset 
and said he was not happy with the results and there is 
information as to if you would like to pay for the sample to be 
retested, and so I gave him that information, and that's when he 
admitted voluntarily *tcr'drinking a lot of alcohol the night 
b^pre att^ tihe Jazz game party, but he then said that the results 
alsoVindicated cocaine which he felt should not have shown up, 
and then I continued to tell him that I had no option but to 
follow the company policy which was to proceed with involuntary 
termination. 
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Okay and do you know if (indiscernible)? 
I'm not aware of them doing anything with that. I do know he 
filed an appeal letter to the plant manager for reinstatement 
which was denied. 
All right. I don't have anymore questions. 
Mr. Phillips do you have questions of the witness? 
Yes I have a couple of questions. Would you please reread the 
drug policy, drug and alcohol policy? 
Okay would you like the handbook condensed version or the full 
policy? 
Just the condensed version that you had indicated before. 
Page 4 of the 1997 Employee Handbook Alcohol and Drugs. "Use or 
distribution of illegal drugs and misuse of prescription drugs 
and/or alcohol cannot and will not be tolerated on the job and 
will be grounds for termination if confirmed by a positive test 
result." Do you want me to continue? 
Yes. 
"Circumstances that warrant testing may include, but are not 
limited to, involvement in an accident or near accident or 
reasonable suspicion that you are under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs." Continue? 
Yes. 
"You are required to report to your supervisor and the human 
resources department the use of any prescription drug which may 
have a negative effect on your work or your behavior while at 
work. It is your responsibility to know of any side effects of 
prescription drugs prescribed by your physician. Depending on 
the side effects you may be asked to obtain confirmation that it 
is acceptable for you to work in your current assignment or you 
may be reassigned to another position until you are no longer 
taking the prescription. With your consent the company may 
consult with your physician regarding an alternate prescription 
that would not have a negative effect on your work. If you are 
not permitted to work because of the prescription in use, you 
may use available personal time or Family/Medical Leave, if 
appropriate, or missed work time. Drug screening helps to 
insure a safe, secure and productive work environment for you 
and your co-workers. Your cooperation will go a long way in 
meeting these objectives and in preserving the reputation of the 
company and the integrity of our products." 
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What you're reading from Ms. Gunnell is part of Exhibit A is 
that correct? 
That's correct. 
On April 1st do you have any personal knowledge as to whether or 
not the claimant was impaired by alcohol or drugs? 
No sir. I was not at work that day. 
Okay. Do you have any information to believe that his ability 
to--to do the job was impaired on that particular day? 
Not first hand, just as I was told by the supervisors and human 
resource representative. 
Do you know when the drug--this drug test was taken? 
On April 1st. 
Do you know what time? 
No sir. 
We're back on record in the matter of the claim of Jon C. 
Edwards. This is side number two. I have changed sides of the 
tape. We have not discussed anything regarding this matter 
while changing the tape. Pam Gunnell, Personnel Representative 
from Autoliv ASP was testifying under cross-examination as we 
went to side two. I've identified for the record Ms. Stice that 
I've changed sides of the tape. Is it correct that since doing 
so we have not discussed anything regarding this matter? 
That is correct. 
And do you concur Mr. Phillips? 
Yes. 
Go ahead with your next question Mr. Phillips. 
Okay. Did you know when this drug test was taken whether it was 
before or after his shift? 
I do not know. 
Okay. Does this Drug and Alcohol policy is it essentially 
(indiscernible)? 
Excuse me? 
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In essence (indiscernible) . In essence if you have any sort of 
alcohol in your system, let's say cough medicine or things of 
that nature is that in itself an individual subject to 
termination? 
Again Dr. Potter is the one who gives it a positive or a 
negative. He's got the guidelines of what he tests for and what 
our company standards are. 
Okay. So if I understand the if the reason why the claimant was 
terminated was based upon his drug testing results? 
The termination was based upon positive test results. 
Okay and that's Exhibit 13? 
I just received a verbal from my manager. I did not receive 
Exhibit 13. 
But that is the sole--Without that drug test, the positive 
result of the drug testing the employer, the claimant would 
still be employed? 
The claimant was on probation for performance problems, but that 
was not at issue. It is correct the termination was based upon 
the positive test results. 
Okay and that was to your understanding information you received 
based upon Exhibit 13? 
That is correct. 
Which is the--The drug testing result from a physician who is 
not here to testify today. Is that correct? 
Dr. Potter, being my manager, he called over the telephone 
(indiscernible) and gave me the result that he had found without 
the piece of paper. 
Okay your manager was not relying upon a piece of paper? 
No. She received a verbal over the telephone. 
Okay. From the doctor who relied on the piece of paper? 
From the doctor who did the test and then talked to Jon before 
he talked to us. 
Okay. I don't have anything else? 
Let me just ask you Ms. Gunnell are you familiar with the Utah 
Drug and Alcohol Testing Act? 
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No sir. I am not. 
Then you can't tell me whether or not your policy or the policy 
that is administered by the employer, the Drug and Alcohol 
Testing policy comports with the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing. 
I cannot testify to that. I do know there he is (indiscernible) 
certified class. 
Do you maintain any type of chain of custody documents? 
Dr. Potter does. 
And do you now whether or not any type of chain of custody 
documents have been submitted to this Department on these 
particular custody procedures? 
I don't know because our legal department is allowing us to 
submit those. 
You're honor we've been trying to get the chain of custody and 
due to the plant shut down we have not been able to get that 
document. If you need it I would like to ask for the record 
remain open so we can get that document. 
Well how long has the plant been closed down Ms. Stice? 
(Indiscernible) 
All of last week and some parts of the week before and some 
parts are shut down this week. 
Well who maintains the--those type of documents Ms. Gunnell? 
Dr. Potter has the chain of custody. 
So why--why wouldn't the employer have just contacted Dr. Potter 
and had those documents released? 
He has to get a release from our attorney, Dick Shimabukuro. 
Why wouldn't Mr. Shimabukuro provide that release to Dr. Potter 
to get the documents. 
He's mostly out town. We don't know which days to call him. 
How about the lab test itself? Do you now whether or not the 
employer has submitted the lab test itself as far as what was 
tested and what the claimant tested positive to if he in fact 
tested positive. 
(Indiscernible) 
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Well do you know whether or not that documentation has been 
submitted in any form? 
I don't believe it has been submitted. 
And is that something that the employer also would maintained? 
As far as the document, would the employer have a copy of the 
lab? 
The employer does not maintain documents. Due to the 
confidentiality of drug tests we do not get any written 
paperwork back about their drug tests. It goes into their file 
so I have nothing other than the verbal. 
By their files, you're referring to the files where? 
The employer's file on site in Ogden at our company. 
Well then who-who has access to those documents? 
The personnel files? 
Yes. 
Just people with a need to know in human resource personnel. 
Well do you have a need to know? Is that part of your job 
duties? 
Well if I come out of this court and find out that I needed to 
have that then I will have to go and make a change for that 
(indiscernible). 
Who has a need to know? Who are the individuals that would have 
a need to know? 
The medical report? 
Yes. 
It's my understanding they keep it strictly confidential and 
it's (indiscernible) the medical (indiscernible). 
Any other questions of the witness Ms. Stice? 
I don't believe so at this time. 
Do you have other witnesses then that you are going to have 
testify? 
I'd first like to step out and see if Mr. Rees is out there. 
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Okay I'll allow Ms. Gunnell to do that. 
Okay. 
I guess it really doesn't matter, but you're the primary 
spokesperson for the employer. Ms. Gunnell has left the hearing 
office. We'll see if we have another witness then available, 
(short pause) We're just remaining on record in the matter of 
the claimant Jon Edwards while we await the next witness for the 
employer. Ms. Gunnell is coming back and you have no-
Re's not there. 
Did you ask the receptionist if anyone else had come in? 
Yes I did. 
And what was their response? 
Nobody. 
Do you have any other witnesses at this time Ms. Stice? 
Yes your honor. I'd like to call Dr. Potter. His number is 
776-44(indiscernible). 
I'll call Dr. Potter then. (phone dialing and ringing) Do you 
have a first name Ms. Stice? 
Lee. 
Work Med this is Connie. May I help you? 
Yes. Could I speak to Dr. Lee Potter please? 
Could I tell him who is calling? 
This is Judge Barnes from the Department of Workforce Services. 
Okay. Hold on just a moment. (short pause) The doctor just 
went in with an injury patient. Could I take a message and have 
him call you back in just a minute or did you want to hold? 
I think at this juncture we'11--we'11 just hold. 
Okay. 
And I am recording our conversation. 
Okay. 
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So you understand. And if you can determine that he's not going 
to be through for a lengthy period of time could you get back on 
the line with me. 
Sure. Okay. Hold on. 
I'm just going to continue this matter. Thank you. Did you 
have any other witnesses Ms. Stice? 
At this point I think I'll save any other witnesses for rebuttal 
witnesses. 
Who did you intend to call? 
In case we need Steve Brown. 
Steve Brown. And what's Steve Brown going to tell me that Ms. 
Gunnell hasn't already told me? 
Well apparently he has some information on the reasonable 
suspicion. 
Well again is it going to be--is it going to be first hand or 
not? 
I am not sure, and (indiscernible). 
Just for clarification purposes Ms. Stice and this particular 
employer, Autoliv ASP, has been before me on numerous occasions 
on drug related cases. Let me make that part of this record, 
and also the Gibbens Company has represented Autoliv before me 
on drug cases on numerous occasions. Is that correct? 
That's probably correct. 
Probably or--I mean you--you--
I don't know that it would be numerous. 
Well I can think of--
I can think of one that I've had with you. 
Well yeah. You know going back as far as the times I've 
conducted hearings, my position would be Mr. Shimabukuro has 
appeared before me on drug related cases in behalf of the 
employer at least on three occasions where I can recall as well 
as other personnel where he has specifically been the attorney 
for the employer appearing before this Tribunal. What I want to 
get to Ms. Stice, are you aware of what the minimum standard 
are--the minimum standards are in drug related cases as far as 
the employer establishing a prima facie case? 
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Yes. 
Do you understand that the elements that would be required is 
does the employer have a promulgated rule, that that rule be, 
comport to the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, that the 
employer submit documentation regarding--
This is Dr. Potter. 
Yes. We#ll continue that Ms. Stice. Dr. Potter, Judge Barnes 
with the Department of Workforce Services. I'm currently 
conducting a hearing on a Jon C. Edwards. You've been called as 
a witness in this matter in behalf of the employer, Autoliv ASP. 
Let me swear you for testimony in this matter. Do you solemnly 
swear or affirm the testimony you will give herein will the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
Yes. 
Would you state your name and position title for the record? 
Lee Potter. I'm a physician. I work for Work Med Occupation of 
Health Clinic. 
And again we are recording the proceedings of this hearing Dr. 
Potter. I have here in the hearing office with me Valerie Stice 
who is representing Autoliv ASP. We also have their, one of 
their human resource persons, Pam Gunnel1. The claimant, Jon C. 
Edwards, is in attendance at the hearing and he is being 
represented by legal counsel, Randall G. Phillips. Ms. Stice 
this is your witness. What questions do you have of Dr. Potter. 
Okay. Dr. Potter do you do act as an MRO for Autoliv ASP? 
Yes. 
Okay. And do you recall a case that you reviewed on a Jon 
Edwards? 
Yes I do. I have had that before me. 
Okay. And will you describe what your role is as the MRO. 
As an MRO my function would be to any--any reports that came 
back on urine drug screens that would be positive, then my role 
would be to see if there is any medical explanation for that 
being positive and then make a determination whether that was, 
there was a medical explanation or not and if not then I would 
report that as being a positive screen. 
Okay. And what did you find when you reviewed Mr. Edwards' drug 
screen? 
25 
1 POTTER: -It was positive for alcohol. * I'm looking here. I don't have 
2 the--I believe it was--Do you have the amount there because I'm 
3 not--I don't--On this one I have I don't have that. 
4 
5 STICK: Okay we don't have an amount, but there is a level, yeah a cut 
6 off level for alcohol? 
7 
8 POTTER: All-All I have here is his--is the report that was a positive, 
9 and I don't--I don't know some — some different labs will have 
10 different cut offs. Some of them will do them at, some will 
11 report any level and some will report anything below a certain 
12 level like .02 as being negative. So I, before me I don't have 
13 the exact level. I don't have the chain of custody right here. 
14 
15 STICE: Okay. Is there anything else that can be mistaken for alcohol 
16 in the system? 
17 
18 POTTER: Not for, this measures for, it measure those ethanol so it would 
19 be for ethanol itself, so not with this test, no. 
20 
21 STICE: All right did you then submit a report to Autoliv? 
22 
23 POTTER: Yes of it being--it being positive for alcohol, yes. 
24 
25 STICE: All right. I don't have any other questions. 
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27 JUDGE: Do you have questions of the witness Mr. Phillips? 
28 
29 PHILLIPS: Yes. Good morning Dr. Potter. 
30 
31 POTTER: Hello. 
32 
33 PHILLIPS: This is Attorney Randy Phillips. You've indicated that there 
34 was just a positive test for alcohol but you don't know to what 
35 amount? 
36 
37 POTTER: Yeah. I don't have that--I don't have--I did know at that time, 
38 but I don't have that report right with me at this time sir. I 
39 just have the Drug Test Report and when I report that out I just 
40 report it as being positive for alcohol. 
41 
42 PHILLIPS: Okay. Could that alcohol be from cough syrup or something like 
43 that? 
44 
45 POTTER: The amounts from that a person would have to take a massive 
46 amount very much over the prescribed amount to have that type of 
47 a level. No just an average normal dose would not produce a 
48 level that would be indicated on this, no. 
49 
50 PHILLIPS: But you've indicated that you're not sure exactly what level 
51 that was, if it was .01, .001. 
52 
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I don't have that information written before me right now. 
And you indicated you don't have the chain of custody. 
Not with me. Not--Not right here. I did review the chain of 
custody yes when I did the report and submitted it, but I don't 
have that with me right now. 
I have nothing further. 
Dr. Potter do you know who would retain the--the drug testing 
results and information of that nature? 
We would have it here, but I don't, like I say, I don't have 
that right with me right now. 
Any other questions of the witness Ms. Stice? 
Just one other question Dr. Potter. Mr. Edwards reported in his 
statements to the Department that the content was .05. Does 
that sound correct to you? 
I can't--I can't recall for sure. I would have to see the chain 
myself and the result of the chain of cus--the result on the 
chain. I don't recall exactly, no. 
All right. Thank you. 
Nothing further Mr. Randall, excuse me Mr. Phillips? 
No questions. 
I have no additional questions then of the witness. I will 
excuse you at this time Dr. Potter. Thank you very much for 
your participation. 
Okay. Thank you. 
I made that disconnect. Let me go back then Ms. Stice so I 
understand your knowledge of the Department's requirements in 
these drug cases. So you understand why I'm asking these 
question is--is the employer is the moving party in the 
separation. 'The employer has the burden of proof. Again is it 
your understanding that in order to make, meet your burden as 
far as establishing a prima facie case that number one that you-
-that you have to establish the employer has a drug testing 
policy that comports with Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act? Is 
that your understanding? 
Yes. 
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Is it further your understanding that in order to--to meet your 
burden and establish a prima facie case that you would have to 
show that the employer has an established rule and that the 
employee is aware of the rule? 
Yes. 
And is it also your understanding that the employer would have 
to establish competent/ through competent evidence that--that 
there was a chain of custody maintained on--on a sample and that 
the individual actually tested positive then to on a drug 
screen? 
Yes and that's the reason for my request that you would allow 
the record to remain open so we could get the chain of custody. 
What about the lab test? We--We have no lab test in this case. 
I know your honor and we were given the report by Dr. Potter who 
has testified. 
But here's my problem. I don't know what method was used as far 
as testing. I don't know who conducted the test. I don't know 
what level that was tested. I don't know what the cut off 
levels are. I don't know whether or not that cut off level 
would show impairment or not. In other words if it was a .001 
test result what would that tell me? Would that show me then 
that the claimant was in violation of the employer's policy or 
not in violation of the policy, and that's some additional 
questions I would have of Ms. Gunnel or whoever is testifying in 
behalf of the employer. If the employer's rule is is misuse of 
drugs if an individual has a alcohol content in their system of 
.001 or .01 or .04 or at what level then does the employer 
consider that the individual would be impaired or would the 
employer consider misuse of alcohol? Do you know the answer to 
those questions Ms. Gunnel1? 
All I can do is refer back to what the handbook where it says if 
you show to work under the use. 
Under the what? Under the use? 
Use or misuse. 
Well again misuse is the word you used. Is it or is it not? 
Misuse. 
Well what does that mean? I don't--I'm asking you. I have no 
idea what it means. 
28 
1 GUNNELL: in the past our cutoff was .05, but it is no longer listed in 
2 the handbook so I--I can't answer that any better. 
3 
4 STICE: it doesn't give an amount your honor. It just says if it's a 
5 positive test it's the policy that, you have a copy. 
6 
7 GUNNELL: We do have reasonable suspicions. He admitted to use. 
8 
9 JUDGE: But the problem is is Dr. Potter's testimony is that many of the 
10 labs have their own cutoff levels and use their own cutoff 
11 levels. I don't know what the cutoff level is, if any, by 
12 Autoliv. 
13 
14 STICE: Again I'd like to make a request that we be allowed to obtain 
15 the chain of custody your honor. There were some mitigating 
16 circumstances and we weren't able to get it for today's hearing. 
17 -r—* 
18 JUDGE: \ If you--If you provide me with a chain of custody that still 
19 isn't going to give me the lab report. That's going to show me 
20 that there was a chain of custody maintained. Is that correct < 
21 Ms. Stice? 
22 
23 STICE: Correct. And it should show the results of the tests I believe. 
24 It should include that on the bottom and possibly the cutoff. 
25 
26 JUDGE: But you haven't--you haven't seen the chain of custody.
 ( 
27 
28 STICE: I have not seen it. 
29 
30 JUDGE: Mr. Shimabukuro was certainly aware that you needed that 
31 documentation is that correct Ms. Stice? 
32 
33 STICE: He was trying to get the document for me. < 
34 
35 JUDGE: From whom? 
36 
37 STICE: I believe he sent a message to several people trying to get the 
38 chain of custody report and so far we have not been able to 
39 track it down. 
40 
41 JUDGE: Do you know if it even exists? 
42 
43 STICE: I believe it exists your honor. I don't have any reason to 
44 believe it doesn't exist. 
45 
46 JUDGE: Well you haven't seen it either is that correct Ms. Stice? 
47 
48 STICE: I have not seen it. 
49 
50 JUDGE: And Ms. Gunnell hasn't seen it? 
51 
52 STICE: No. 
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Apparently Dr. Potter has seen it but--
He has seen it. 
And as far as--Again as far as the positive test result would it 
be the employer's position Ms. Gunnell that no matter what level 
if--if--if then you get back the report saying it's testing 
positive that would be grounds for termination. Is that my 
understanding of the employer's position in this case? 
I'll admit that I am confused because my previous understanding 
was our cutoff level was .05. Our handbook does say misuse of 
alcohol cannot and will not be tolerated and will be grounds for 
termination so I, myself, am a little confused as to if the 
policy change or if the handbook was more generic or written 
more general. 
Did you have any other witnesses then at this time Ms. Stice? 
Your honor could we possibly try to phone Mr. Rees and see if we 
could get his testimony that way? 
If you have a number where we can--
I do have a number. 
--reach Mr. Rees. 
It is 629-9937. 
First name? 
Mike. (phone dialing and ringing) 
This is Mike Rees. I'm not available to accept your call at 
this time. Please leave me a message and I'll get back to you 
as soon as I can. Thank you. 
Should I disconnect Ms. Stice? 
Yes. I'd like to make a request that we be allowed to call Mr. 
Shimabukuro and perhaps he can give us some more information on 
the policy. 
What's Mr. Shimabukuro's number? 
625-9598 
625? (dialing and ringing) 
Your call is being answered by Audix. 
30 
Do you want me to disconnect? 
--is not available. To leave a message--
(dial tone) 
Your honor Ms. Gunnell has made a request that we be allowed to 
called the manager of physicians in human resources. 
Who is that? 
Mr. Roger Tea will testify to the company policy and the 
amounts. 
I guess the problem l#m going to have, you as a human resource 
person Ms. Gunnell, if you don't know what the policy is, if you 
don't know what the cutoff levels are how would--how would Mr. 
Edwards know? 
I'm not--I don't understand an employee has to know what the 
level is. If they test positive at the lab standard then it's 
positive and he should not have come to work. I was told he 
reported to work intoxicated. He told me himself he was up late 
drinking a large amount of alcohol plus the cocaine in his 
system. 
We have no evidence there was any cocaine in his system, and I'm 
just really guessing Mr. Edwards isn't going to testify that he 
was using cocaine. I'm not in--I'm not in his head right now as 
far as knowing where he's coming from, but I'm almost going to 
bet you that he's not going to tell me that he was using 
cocaine. 
He'll be under oath. 
Well we'11--Well we'll swear him for testimony and ask him if he 
was using cocaine. And again if he was using cocaine and he was 
tested then my question is is why then did the test result not 
come back positive for cocaine? 
Well we didn't ask Dr. Potter that specifically. 
Dr. Potter did not make any indication at all that there was any 
drug substance in the claimant's system, only alcohol. Is that 
your understanding Ms. Stice? 
That was my understanding, but there was an admission by Mr. 
Edwards to that he at some point had used cocaine. 
Well again even if we have an admission if we don't have a 
positive test result do we have--do we have a violation of the 
employer's policy? 
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Well we do with the alcohol. 
Well you know I understand where you're coming from Ms. Stice. 
Who--Who is going to shed any light then on the matter? 
Possibly Mr. Tea if we call him. 
What's--Again what's the person's name we're calling? 
Roger Tea. T-e-a. 625-9280. 
(phone dialing and ringing) 
Roger Tea's office. This is Nita. 
This is Judge Barnes with the Department of Workforce Services 
calling. Could I speak to Roger Tea? 
Sir he is not here. He will be back in the office Friday. I 
could transfer you back to his voice mail. He checks on that 
daily if that would help. 
I have Pam Gunnel 1 from the human resource department here in 
the office. 
Uh huh (positive). 
Could we have her transfer us to Laura Cruby, Human Resource 
Manager? 
Yes I can try doing that. Thank you. 
Thank you. (Music while holding-short pause-phone ringing) 
Hi. This is Laura Cruby, Autoliv Human Resource Manager, at the 
Ogden facility. I'm away from my office right now--
I'm going to terminate the call Ms. Stice. Anything else Ms. 
Stice? 
Not at this time your honor. 
Mr. Phillips I'm assuming you are going to have Mr. Edwards 
testify regarding this matter is that correct? 
Yes sir. 
You've already been sworn for testimony Mr. Edwards. Mr. 
Edwards going back to October of 1996, were you involved in a--
a--a DUI incident while driving a company vehicle? 
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I was in a vehicle. I wasn't driving. I was parked in a 
parking lot, and it was during work time. It was a Saturday, my 
day off, and before I got to the car a Highway Patrol in Ohio 
said is that your car because it's a rented car and it's just 
like he zeroed me out. I hadn't even gotten to the car yet and 
they did all the tests. They did give me a breathalizer. it 
didn't register. Then he hand wrote the number in. it was 
supposed to be a printout, and he said I'll do any dam thing I 
want. I should have brought the ticket but I didn't know that 
was going to show up. 
Were you charged with a DUI? 
Yes I was, but then it's not on record. They called back there 
to see what they had me do and this and that and it was not on 
record back there anymore. 
Did you say anymore? 
on the charge? 
Did you have to pay a fine? What happened 
They put me in jail and I had to pay $500.00 to get out of jail, 
but that's the only fine. I was never fined anything else with 
this DUI. 
On April 1, 1998, did you submit to a--a urine drug testing? 
What day? 
April 1st. 
Of '98. Yes I did. 
And what--what time of day or night was--
By the time I got the test taken it was about 11:30. 
11:30 a.m.? 
A.M. I was there at work. I had asked for a half a day off, 
personal time, to go get my taxes done because it was getting 
time, and I was on my way out and I got stopped. 
When do--What time--What time is your work schedule Mr. Edwards? 
What hours did you work on that day? 
6:00 to 2:00, but I had taken a half a day off and I was leaving 
at 10:00. 
So 6:00 a.m. you worked from 6:00 a.m. to 11:30? 
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No. I punched out and was on my way out the door at 10:00. By 
the time they made me go up# they took me over there and by the 
time they had taken the drug test it was 11:30. 
But you had then worked approximately four hours into your 
shift? 
Yes. 
And you say someone stopped you. Who stopped you? 
My--My line coordinator. 
Who was that? 
Lou Montoya. 
And did he tell you why he was stopping you? 
Yes he did, and he said he didn't know why they were doing it 
because I was not impaired or anything. The only possible thing 
is somebody could have smelled it. 
Smelled what? 
Alcohol. But I mean everybody smells like that as they go out. 
Did the employer tell you why you were being tested? 
No they didn't tell me. They didn't give me any reason that I 
was impaired or anything other than they smelled alcohol. 
And in proximity to you, proximity to 10:00 a.m. in the morning 
when had you last consumed any type of alcohol? 
About 1:00 in the morning. 
How much alcohol had you consumed during the prior 24 hour 
period? Going from 1:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.? 
Oh, oh. 
During the 24 hour period how much alcohol had you consumed the 
pf&lrious day? 
I can't really remember. I was--We were at the Salt Palace or 
not the Salt Palace but the Delta Center and I can't remember 
how many beers, and we bought some beer on the way home. 
Well give me an idea of how much? 
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Maybe a little over two six packs of beer. Maybe 14 cans of 
beer. 
Were you--Were you driving? 
No. 
How did you get to work? 
They dropped me off at my house and I drove in the morning. 
So you drove to work yourself the following morning? 
Yes. 
Were you in any type of condition that you could have been 
driving a vehicle? 
Yeah I was in good condition. I mean-
Tell me what your normal drinking patterns are. 
Well they're few and far between anymore because I'm a diabetic, 
but I don't--I don't know I used to, years ago I used to go out 
and party all the time, but now I just don't do it. 
Did you subsequently then have a conversation with Ms. Gunnell 
regarding a test result? 
Uh huh (positive). 
When was that? 
The 6th of April. 
Did you work after April the 1st? 
Yes. 
What other days did you work? 
I worked a half a day on the 1st. I don't have a calendar, but 
I worked right up till the 6th. 
What did Ms. Gunnell tell you then regarding your continued 
employment status? 
That they were going to fire me because they got positive on the 
urine test, one of the tests they did. 
And do you remember discussing with her whether or not you had 
been drinking prior to April 1st when you came on shift? 
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Yeah I told her exactly what I told you that I had been out late 
at night and I did drink. That's all she--You know, that's the 
only thing she asked me* 
Did you discuss with her using cocaine? 
I didn't. 
Was that subject ever brought up as far as cocaine? 
It was brought up but we didn't discuss it at all. I found out 
that in the test that the medications that I take some of the 
medications could have shown up as all different kinds of things 
depending on how high your blood sugar is or how low your blood 
sugar is. 
Were you ever shown a copy of the laboratory test result? 
No. I wrote that down. 
Did you ever make a request of the employer to--to see the test 
result? 
No I didn't. 
Why? 
I didn't know that--that--I didn't know that I could, should 
have or could have. 
Questions you have of the witness Mr. Phillips? 
Yes. Were you aware of what the standard was as far as the use 
of alcohol prior to working (indiscernible) .05, .01, .08? 
I didn't realize it was anything until I read that it was .05, 
but that was after. See you sign your Handbook and they say if 
you signed it you know what was in the Handbook, and everybody 
just signs their Handbook and gives them the card and then takes 
their Handbook home. I never read it till after this happened. 
And were you aware that there was a change after '97? 
I heard there was one. 
At that the time you arose to work on April 1st were you 
impaired? 
No I wasn't. 
Were you able to do the job, in your opinion, in the same manner 
you would do it if you had not drank the night before? 
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Exactly. Yes. 
Did anybody come to you while doing your job, have you been 
drinking, express any concerns about their safety? 
Nobody said a word. 
What type of machinery did you operate? 
Mostly rivet guns and bag, there's a bag full and most the rivet 
gun just pulls the rivet in and out of the holes? 
Do you work alone? 
Everybody works alone at their own station. 
How far away is the next person from you? 
It's a long way. It's far. It's probably eight, ten feet 
between people. 
Have you (indiscernible) have you ever been out to any luncheons 
with other employees? 
Yes. 
Are those--
Object to the relevancy your honor. 
Where are you going with your questioning? 
Just to indicate that management engages in the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages and has not run into disciplinary measures. 
Your questions--You're going far field with your questioning Mr. 
Phillips. In this particular case it's the employer's position 
that the claimant was tested under their reasonable suspicion 
category or clause so again I don't know really where you're 
going with your question as far as whether or not management 
consumes alcohol• 
I guess what I'm trying to get is that according to the employer 
it's zero tolerance as far as consumption of alcohol, and there 
should be a uniform application of that rule. 
I'm going to allow the--allow the question, 
respond Mr. Edwards. 
Have you been to luncheons? 
Yes I have. 
Go ahead and 
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Has there been alcohol consumed during those luncheons among 
employees? 
Yes. 
What types of alcohol? 
Mostly beer. 
Okay. Do you know who, specific names of individuals that you 
have personal knowledge of consuming alcohol? 
Yes I do. 
What are those names? 
Let me just--Let me just insert here, what's the purpose of 
naming names. If you want management individuals and you want 
to ask whether they were co-workers, management, I can see the 
line of questioning Mr. Phillips, and I don't know that we're 
here as an inquisition to have other individuals involved in 
possible investigation by the employer and I'm not going to open 
the floor, open this as a forum to that type of questioning. 
If--If--If it goes to whether or not management was aware that 
individuals were consuming alcohol during normal work hours, 
whether it was on their lunch time or not I'll allow that 
question, but I don't think I'm going to allow him to go into 
the names etcetera of individuals. 
I--I'11 strike that question. Was, to your knowledge, both the 
management and employees involved in the consumption of alcohol? 
Yes they were. 
Were they then also returning to work? 
Yes they were. 
Has anybody in the human resource department consumed alcohol. 
No. 
I object to that question (indiscernible). 
Well do you want him to respond what the names Ms. Stice? 
No. Your honor. 
I think we're opening a can of worms. 
I think we are because I would like the opportunity if we have 
names to have those individuals be able to respond. 
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Well if you want the names we'll, you know, we can have Mr. 
Edwards recite the names, but I don't think you want to do that 
Ms. Stice. 
No. I don't want to do that. 
And--And again the testimony of the claimant as far as what 
weight I'm going to give this, I'm not going to give much weight 
to what he's telling me now Ms. Stice. 
Okay. 
It's certainly not going to--to affect the outcome of my 
decision in this particular matter whether--whether individuals 
were consuming alcohol on the lunch hour or not. Mr. Phillips 
is going to have to show me some more relevance and you know 
hopefully this is the foundation and he's going really show me 
some relevance. If he doesn't then I'm not going to give the 
testimony much weight. Mr. Phillips. 
Are you aware of these employees then came back to work? 
Yes sir. 
You need to get a time frame Mr. Phillips. This is 1996, 1997 
whatever. 
Was this recently within the last three months? 
Yeah three or four months, yeah. 
Okay. Did any of these employees, and I know you're not an 
expert as far as intoxication, did they come back tipsy or--? 
Yes they did. 
(Indiscernible) leave the--the establishment and come back to 
work? 
Yes. 
And to the best of your knowledge were they reprimanded or 
terminated? 
No. 
Are they still employed? 
Two of them are not employed there, but they never reprimanded 
for that. It was something else. 
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Okay. And your testimony would be that, correct me if I'm 
wrong, is that you had actually punched out before any question 
as far as your doing the job? 
Yes, Yes I did. 
And you had spoken with your manager, (indiscernible) what was 
going on right? 
It was the line coordinator. He--He didn't know why they wanted 
to talk to me, or yes he did. He mentioned something about it, 
but he couldn't figure out why, and they wanted him 
(indiscernible)• 
Bid he ask you if you had been drinking? 
Yes and I told him, he asked me and I told him that I went to 
the Jazz game and that I had been drinking, but not after 1:00 
in the morning. 
Did he indicate to you in his opinion he didn' t think were 
impaired? 
Yes. 
He didn't witness it himself? 
He didn't think so. 
Okay, no, nothing further. 
Do you have questions of the witness Ms. Stice? 
I do have a couple of questions. Back in '96, October of '96 
did you enter a treatment program at that time? 
Yes I did. It was the rules for--for (indiscernible). 
All right. You say that you operated a rivet gun? 
Yes. 
What is that? 
A rivet gun has got two handles on it. It's got a button on 
each one that are air feed. The rivet gun squeezes the metal 
(indiscernible) together. 
Some type of equipment you operated? 
Yes. 
40 
1 STICE: 
2 
3 CLAIMANT: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 STICE: 
10 
11 
12 JUDGE: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 PHILLIPS: 
22 
23 CLAIMANT: 
24 
25 PHILLIPS: 
26 
27 CLAIMANT: 
28 
29 JUDGE: 
30 
31 
32 STICE: 
33 
34 JUDGE: 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 Salt Lake 
47 August 17, 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
And what was the other thing that you said you did? 
Well (indiscernible) four or five rivet guns, two bag folders 
and that was about it. But the bag holder machine you can't get 
hurt because as soon as you break the light bearer it not 
running or the rivet guns I've never seen anything get hurt on 
that. 
Okay but would it be correct that in the position you held you 
always used some type of machinery? 
We're back on record in the matter of the claim of Jon C. 
Edwards (problem with tape - mostly indiscernible on all of side 
3 - approximately ten minutes) (Indiscernible) Well if you 
were driving a vehicle and you (indiscernible) .05 are you in 
violation of the law or not in violation of the law? 
(Indiscernible) established the cutoff as .08 as far as motor 
vehicle operation. (Indiscernible) Do you have anything further 
Mr. Phillips? 
I just have one question. (Indiscernible) drug screen? 
(Indiscernible). 
(Indiscernible) 
(Indiscernible)• 
Anything further Ms. Stice? 
(Indiscernible) in rebuttal? 
(Indiscernible) 
(Indiscernible) 
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Unemployment insurance benefits were denied on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his 
employment for disqualifying reasons. This decision relieved the employer's benefit ratio account for 
benefits paid to the claimant. The claimant was held to be at fault in the creation of a $717 overpayment. 
Timeliness of the appeal is an issue to be determined in accordance with Sections 35A-4-406(2) and 35A-4-
406(3) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto. 
The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from July 9,1998, further written appeal 
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(Applicable Sections of the Utah Employment Security Act and Rules and Regulations are quoted on the 
following pages.) 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits against the State of Utah effective April 12, 
1998, the claimant worked as an assembler for Autoliv ASP from October 19, 1993 to April 6, 1998. He 
was terminated from his employment for an alleged positive drug/alcohol drug screen. 
The employer initiated an alcohol and drug abuse policy to provide a drug free workplace. Employees, 
including the claimant, were made aware of the policy through information disseminated in an employee 
handbook and memorandums pertaining to alcohol and drug related matters. The claimant received the 
employer's correspondence and was aware of the alcohol and drug rules. The employer's policy provides, 
in part: 
2.0 Scope: 
Except for legally obtained over-the-counter and prescription drugs, alcohol and other drugs 
are barred from being brought onto company premises. Company personnel are prohibited 
from engaging in Company operations while under the influence of drugs which might cause 
their activities to jeopardize the health and safety of themselves or of others. 
5.0 Procedure: 
The use of any legally obtained drug, including alcohol, to the point where such use 
adversely affects the employee's job performance is prohibited. 
This prohibition includes arriving on Company premises under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug which adversely affects the employee's job performance, including also the use of 
prescribed drugs under medical direction. 
Any employee engaging in the misuse of alcoholic beverages or prescription drugs or any 
employee found selling, purchasing, transferring, using or possessing illegal drugs on 
Company premises or while on Company business anywhere is subject to termination of 
employment with the Company. 
The employer's drug and alcohol testing policy provides that testing be performed on a random basis, 
following an accident, or for reasonable suspicion. 
The claimant received a Notice of Caution letter dated October 24, 1996. The warning was issued as a result 
of the claimant's actions on October 12, 1996 while on a business trip for the company. The claimant was 
cited and charged with D.U.I. The claimant was placed on a one-year probation and required to participate 
in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation program. The claimant successfully completed the probationary period. 
The claimant attended a Utah Jazz game the afternoon of March 31,1998. He consumed approximately two 
six-packs of beer between 4:00 p.m. that afternoon and 1:00 a.m. the following day. He reported to the 
workplace after 6:00 a.m. on April 1, 1998. He personally drove his vehicle to the job site. He performed 
his routine job functions for approximately four hours. He had requested time off to take care of some 
personal matters. 
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The claimant clocked out at approximately 10:00 a.m. Before leaving the building, a supervisor approached 
the claimant and informed him that he needed to submit to a drug test. The claimant questioned the 
supervisor about the reason for the test. The supervisor did not divulge the purpose of the test. He 
commented to the claimant that he had seen nothing unusual about his job performance that morning. 
The claimant submitted a urine sample at a WorkMed facility at approximately 11:30 a.m. on April 1, 1998. 
The medical reviewing officer (MRO) subsequently reported to the employer that the claimant had tested 
positive on the drug/alcohol screen. 
The employer did not submit a copy of the chain of custody documentation on the sample submitted by the 
claimant for testing. The lab report, identifying the nature of the test results, was not made available to the 
administrative law judge at the time of the hearing. The employer's witnesses were not knowledgeable of 
the cut-off levels established by the employer for testing purposes. 
The claimant completed an application for unemployment insurance benefits on April 14, 1998. He was 
determined monetarily eligible to receive $239 a week with the effective date of the claim. As part of the 
initial claims process, the claimant provided a written statement to the Department identifying the reasons 
for his separation from Autoliv ASP. He reported in his statement that he was terminated because of an 
alleged positive drug screen. The employer provided written documentation to the Department identifying 
he was terminated "for testing positive for alcohol after reporting to work under the influence." 
The Department mailed the claimant a Decision of Eligibility form on May 21, 1998 which held that he was 
not at fault in his discharge from work. He was subsequently paid unemployment insurance benefits in the 
amount of $239 for each of the weeks ended May 2 through May 16, 1998. 
The Department mailed the claimant another eligibility decision on May 26, 1998 holding he had been 
discharged from his employment for not following a reasonable policy, rule or instruction from his employer. 
An attendant notice advised the claimant that he was at fault in the creation of a $717 overpayment. 
The claimant had previously retained an attorney to assist him in an attempt to be reinstated to his position 
with Autoliv ASP. He delivered the three Department decisions to his attorney the latter part of May 1998 
to request legal advice on handling the matter with the Department. The attorney spent several days 
researching information in a local law library regarding precedent cases where individuals had been allowed 
benefits and then denied without additional due process. The attorney understood from reading the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act that he had 30 days to file an appeal before the Department's decision became 
final. He submitted an appeal in behalf of his client to the Department on June 10, 1998. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
A. TIMELINESS 
Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that the claimant, or any other party 
entitled to notice of a determination, may file an appeal from such determination within ten days after the 
date of mailing of the notice to his last-known address or, if the notice is not mailed, within ten days after 
the date of delivery of the notice. However, Rule R562-406-304 adds an additional three days when the 
determination is mailed, for a total of thirteen (13) days rather than ten. The Unemployment Insurance Rules 
pertaining to this section provide, in part: 
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R994-406-308. Good Cause for Not Filing Within Time Limitations. 
(1) A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is determined that the appeal 
was delayed for good cause. Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is shown that: 
(a) the appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt of the decision if such 
receipt was beyond the original appeal period and not the result of willful neglect; or 
(b) the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the appellant; or 
(c) the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which were compelling 
and reasonable. 
In the present case, the claimant's attorney had reason to believe through his reading of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act that he had 30 days to act on the initial decisions issued to his client by the 
Department. The claimant certainly acted in good faith by retaining legal counsel to represent him before 
the Department on the issue of his eligibility to receive unemployment insurance benefits. Under these 
special circumstances, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not fail without good cause 
to file a timely appeal, and the case therefore will be considered on its merits. 
B. SEPARATION 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that an individual is ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period if the employer discharged the claimant for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interests. The Unemployment Insurance Rules 
pertaining to this section provide, in part: 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
(1) The basic factors which establish just cause, and are essential for a 
determination of ineligibility are: 
(a) Culpability. 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests. A discharge would not be 
considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with reasonable employment practices. The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the context of the particular employment 
and how it affects the employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential 
harm may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important in determining if the act or 
omission is an isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employee who has 
historically complied with work rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
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though harmful, that such violations will be repeated and therefore require discharge to avoid 
future harm to the employer... 
(b) Knowledge. 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer 
expected. It is not necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the 
expected behavior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation 
of a universal standard of behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous 
or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning is one way of 
showing that the employee had knowledge of the expected conduct. After the employee is 
given a warning he should be given an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct. 
Additional violations occurring after the warning would be necessary to establish just cause 
for the discharge... 
(c) Control. 
The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of the claimant to 
control or prevent. 
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be 
considered in determining eligibility for benefits. The following examples do not include 
all reasons for discharge. 
(1) Violation of Company Rules. 
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the employer and the three elements 
of culpability, knowledge and control are established, benefits must be denied. 
(a) The reasonableness of the employer's rules will depend on the necessity for that 
rule as it affects the employer's interests. Rules which are contrary to general public policy 
or which infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not be 
reasonable. An employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating conduct when 
employees are on the job than when they are not. An employer must be able to make rules 
for employee on-the-job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate business interests of 
the employer. An employer is not required to impose only minimum standards, but there 
may be some justifiable cause for violations of rules that are unreasonable or unduly harsh, 
rigorous or exacting. When rules are changed, adequate notice and reasonable opportunity 
to comply must be afforded. If the employee believes a rule is unreasonable, he has the 
responsibility to discuss his concerns with the employer and give the employer an 
opportunity to take corrective action. 
(b) Discharges may be regulated by an employment contract or collective 
bargaining agreement. Just cause for the discharge is not established if the employee's 
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conduct was consistent with his rights under a contract or the discharge was contrary to the 
provisions of the contract. 
(c) Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct if it is found that the act was 
condoned by the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary. However, when the 
worker is given notice that the conduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations could 
result in a denial of benefits. 
(d) Culpability may be established even if the result of the violation of the rule does '"~ 
not in and of itself cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of compliance with 
rules diminishes the employer's ability to have order and control. Culpability is established 
if termination of the employee was required to maintain necessary discipline in the company. 
(e) Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior is usually provided in the 
form of verbal instructions, written rules or warnings. However, the warning is not always 
necessary for a disqualification to apply in cases of violations of a serious nature of universal 
standards of conduct of which the claimant should have been aware without being warned. 
(6) Abuse of Drugs and Alcohol. 
(a) The Legislature, under the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, Section 34-38-1 
et seq., has determined that the illegal use of drugs and abuse of alcohol creates an unsafe 
and unproductive work place. In balancing the interests of employees, employers and the 
welfare of the general public, the Legislature has found that the fair and equitable testing for 
drugs and alcohol in the work place is in the interest of all parties. 
(b) An employer can establish a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under 
the Employment Security Act based on testing conducted under the Drug and Alcohol 
Testing Act by providing the following information: 
(1) A written policy on drug or alcohol testing which is consistent with the 
requirements of the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act. 
(2) Reasonable proof and description of the method for communicating the policy 
to all employees, including a statement that violation of the policy may result in termination. 
(3) Proof of testing procedures used which would include: 
a. Documentation of sample collection, storage and transportation procedures. 
b. Documentation that the results of any screening test for drugs were verified or 
confirmed by gas chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy or other 
comparably reliable analytical methods. 
c. A copy of the verified or confirmed positive drug test report or alcohol test 
report. 
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(c) The above documentation will be admissible as competent evidence under 
various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
respecting "records of regularly conducted activity," unless determined otherwise by a court 
of law. 
(d) A positive alcohol test result will be considered disqualifying if it shows a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater per 100 milliliters of blood or 210 
liters of breath. A blood or breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 grams may also 
be disqualifying if the claimant works in an occupation governed by a state or federal law 
which allows or requires termination from employment at a lower standard. 
(e) Proof of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result or refusal 
to provide a test sample indicates a violation of a reasonable employer rule for which the 
claimant may be disqualified from receipt of unemployment benefits, provided that the 
employee's termination was consistent with the employer's written drug and alcohol testing 
policy. 
(f) In addition to the drug and alcohol testing provisions above, a prima facie case 
of ineligibility for benefits under the Employment Security Act may be established through 
the introduction of other competent evidence. 
In the present case, the employer failed to submit documentation into evidence as proof of their testing 
procedures. The chain of custody document and lab report were not submitted to verify or confirm a positive 
drug or alcohol test result. The employer's entire case, therefore, consisted of hearsay evidence. The drug 
test report provided by the employer does not meet the exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, the 
employer's witnesses were unable to establish any type of cut-off level or for that matter that the claimant, 
in fact, tested positive on the drug screen. The employer's alcohol and drug abuse policy specifically 
prohibits individuals being on company premises under the influence of alcohol or any drug which adversely 
affects the employee's job performance. The employer's sum total of evidence presented at the appeal 
hearing consists of the claimant's acknowledgment that he had been drinking the night before the drug test 
and an observation that he smelled of alcohol. These conditions, in and of themselves, would not be in 
violation of the employer's alcohol and drug rules. The employer failed to establish that the claimant was 
under the influence of alcohol while working on April 1, 1998 or that any use of alcohol the previous day 
adversely affected the claimant's job performance. 
In the absence of competent evidence to support the employer's allegations, there is simply insufficient 
evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the claimant violated the employer's drug and alcohol 
policy. In light of these circumstances, the administrative law judge has no alternative but to conclude the 
claimant was not discharged for just cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act. The 
employer, as the moving party in the separation, had the burden to establish the circumstances involved in 
the job separation and failed to do so through the presentation of legally competent evidence. 
The Utah Employment Security Act relieves an employer of charges for unemployment insurance benefits 
when the employer discharged the claimant for reasons which are disqualifying under Section 35A-4-405(2) 
of the Act or for non-performance due to medical reasons. The Act does not grant relief when the reason 
for the discharge would not have resulted in a disqualification, even if the discharge resulted from 
circumstances over which the employer had no control. In this case, the claimant was not discharged for 
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disqualifying reasons, and none of the exceptions contained in Section 35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment 
Security Act and R994-307-101 apply. The employer, therefore, is ineligible for relief of charges. 
C. OVERPAYMENT 
Inasmuch as the claimant has been found by the administrative law judge to be eligible to receive 
unemployment insurance benefits on the basis of his job separation, the $717 overpayment assessed for the 
weeks ended May 2 through May 16, 1998 will be set aside. 
DECISION: 
98-A-2441: 
The claimant established good cause for filing a late appeal and the case was considered on its merits as 
provided by the Department of Workforce Services Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
98-A-2752: 
The Department's decision denying unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 
35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is herein reversed. The claimant is allowed 
unemployment insurance benefits effective April 12,1998, and continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. 
The employer, Autoliv ASP, is not relieved of charges as provided by Section 35A-4-307 of the Utah 
Employment Security Act and is liable for its pro-rated share of benefit costs paid to this claimant. 
98-A-2753: 
The $717 overpayment established for the weeks ended May 2 through May 16, 1998 in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 35A-4-406(4) of the Utah Employment Security Act is set aside. 
Norman Barnes 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
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DECISION: 
Benefits are allowed 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated July 9, 1998, the Administrative Law Judge reversed the Department decision 
and allowed benefits to the claimant effective April 12, 1998, pursuant to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the 
Utah Employment Security Act. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: July 30, 1998 
ISSUES BEFORE THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT AND THE UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE: 
1. Did the Administrative Law Judge have good cause to assume jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §35A-4-406(3). 
2. Was the claimant discharged for just cause pursuant to §35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
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3. Should the employer, Autoliv ASP, Inc., be held liable for benefit charges pursuant to 
§35A-4-307. 
4. Were the attorney fees awarded to the claimant's legal counsel appropriate within the 
guidelines of Department Rule R994-103-303 of the Utah Administrative Code (1997)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
Except as noted below, the Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The employer complains that the Administrative Law Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 
because the appeal was untimely and good cause was not shown. The claimant filed a late appeal 
of the lower level Department decision. The Administrative Law Judge found good cause for the 
late filing due in part to the unusual and perhaps confusing nature of the Department's actions. The 
first Department decision was dated and mailed on May 21, 1998 together with benefit checks 
totaling $717.00. The second Department decision, this one denying benefits, was sent on May 22, i 
1998. Apparently under separate cover, a "Notice of Unemployment Benefit Overpayment" was also 
mailed to the claimant on May 22, 1998. This notice treated the overpayment as a "fault" 
overpayment without making any findings or explanation as to how or why the claimant was at fault 
as required by Department rule. If for no other reason, the Administrative Law Judge had an 
obligation to assume jurisdiction over the appeal to take evidence on the issue of fault. Having 
assumed jurisdiction to correct an agency oversight, it was appropriate for the Administrative Law 
Judge to rectify other inconsistencies in the record. The Board finds that there was good cause for 
allowing the untimely appeal in this case. 
The employer also objects to the "testimony" of claimant's counsel on the issue of timeliness. While 
the Board agrees that it is improper for lawyers to be advocates in matters where they are likely to 
be necessary as a witness, the statement of the attorney in this case was not improper. Lawyers are 
often called upon to offer explanations to tribunals on questions of procedure. An attorney cannot 
be expected to withdraw from every case where it might be necessary to explain why a pleading was 
filed late. The attorney did not testify about a contested fact as required under Rule 3.7 of the 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. 
The employer next complains about what it characterizes as prejudicial comments made by the 
Administrative Law Judge. The issue was whether or not the claimant admitted using cocaine. 
Given that the claimant had previously told the employer that the test should not have been positive 
for cocaine, it was not untoward for the Administrative Law Judge to assume that the claimant's 
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testimony would be consistent with his prior statements. The Board finds that the statements of the 
Administrative Law Judge did not influence the testimony of the claimant or prejudice the employer. 
The reason the employer "lost" this case was because it failed to provide the Administrative Law 
Judge with evidence to support its allegations. While the employer provided that evidence on appeal 
to the Board, the Board is not persuaded that the evidence was not available at the time of the 
hearing. The employer called its Medical Review Officer, Dr. Potter, as a witness at the hearing. 
Dr. Potter testified that he was in possession of the appropriate documentation but it was not in front 
of him when he testified from his office by phone. There was no evidence or explanation presented 
by the employer as to why Dr. Potter could not have asked for a brief recess in order to get the 
documentation necessary to present competent evidence at the hearing. Had Dr. Potter obtained that 
evidence and sent it to the Administrative Law Judge by fax while the hearing was still in progress, 
the employer would have established a prima facie case. Without that evidence, the Administrative 
Law Judge had no choice but to find that the employer had not met its burden of proof. 
The employer urges the Board to accept the results of the alcohol test as evidence now, after the 
completion of the evidentiary process. While the Board has wide latitude in accepting new evidence, 
the Board has been consistent in refusing to do so without a showing as to why the evidence could 
not have been presented at the evidentiary hearing. The reason for this is obvious. A party is 
disadvantaged to the point of being denied due process if evidence can be presented summarily at 
the review stage without opportunity for inspection, rebuttal or cross-examination. The Board is also 
troubled by the fact that this employer has in house counsel who is familiar with these issues, was 
represented at the hearing by an employer representative, has had several hearings on this and similar 
issues in recent months and has been told on repeated occasions by the Department what evidence 
is necessary to meet its burden in drug and alcohol cases. That, taken together with the fact that the 
evidence was available to the employer at the time of the hearing and the claimant would be 
prejudiced by its late admission. 
The Board, in its review of this case, finds that the award of attorney's fees to claimant's counsel is 
inconsistent with the Department rule. The claimant's attorney filed a petition for attorney's fees 
stating that he spent three hours researching and drafting the appeal to the Administrative Law Judge. 
This "appeal" is really in the form of a brief. Rule R994-103-303 of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1997) states that an attorney's fee is appropriate for the "preparation of a brief, if required (A brief 
should be submitted only when requested or approved by the Administrative Law Judge. If a brief 
is submitted which is not requested or necessary, the approved fee may be reduced by the charges 
for time spent on the brief)" [emphasis supplied] 
While the Board recognizes that the procedure followed by the Department in the sending of two 
conflicting decisions one day apart was unusual, it did not necessitate the preparation of a brief in 
this case. Additionally, a portion of the brief was dedicated to explaining why the attorney filed a 
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late appeal. Since the claimant was in no way responsible for the late filing, the Board finds that 
approval of a $500.00 fee was inappropriate in this case and hereby reduces that fee to $300.00. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the 
claimant effective April 12, 1998 under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) is affirmed. 
The employer, Autoliv ASP, Inc., is held liable for charges in connection with this claim as provided 
by §35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
The attorney's fee awarded to claimant's counsel, Randall G. Phillips, is reduced to $300 in 
accordance with the guidelines stated in Rule R994-103-303 of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1997). 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63 -46b-13(1 )(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to each party 
by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an order within 
20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing of a 
request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a request 
for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This decision 
will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for such an 
appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department 
of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal with 
the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting 
forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35 A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment Security Act; 
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§63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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